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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS OF LAw - SELF-INCRIMINATION
PRIVILEGE - MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY HELD To BE CRIMINAL
OFFENSE - COMMUNIST PARTY REQUIRED To REGISTER WITH THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL. - Junius Scales was convicted under the membership clause of the
Smith Acte of being a knowing member of an organization of persons who advocate
the violent overthrow of the Government of the United States. The indictment
charged that from 1946 to 1954 the Communist Party of the United States of
America was such an organization and that throughout that period Scales was a
member thereof, with knowledge of the Party's illegal purpose and a specific intent
to accomplish the violent overthrow of the Government as speedily as circum-
stances would permit. On writ of certiorari the Supreme Court held: affirmed.
Such membership when active may be made a criminal offense without violating
the first or fifth amendments to the United States Constitution. Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). In a companion case involving another conviction
under the membership clause of the Smith Act, the Court reversed on the ground
that the evidence of illegal advocacy by the organization of which petitioner had
been charged with being a member (the Communist Party) was insufficient to
support his conviction. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). In a third
case decided the same day the Court affirmed an order of the Subversive Activities
Control Board requiring the Communist Party of the United States of America
(,CPUSA) to register with the Attorney General as a "Communist-action organi-
zation" under §7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.2 The term
"Communist-action organization" is defined in §3 of the Act as an organization
which is "substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign govern-
ment or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement." The
Party must register. Communist Party of the United States of America v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
The validity of certain portions of the Smith Act was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Dennis v. United Statess in which the Court affirmed the convictions of
11 top Communist leaders. The Party leaders had been indicted for conspiring
to organize a group of persons who advocate' the violent overthrow of the Govern-
1 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1959):
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches
the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying
the government of the United States or the government of any State,
Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political
subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of
any officer of any such government; or
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such
government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes,
or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising,
or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing
or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence,
or attempts to do so; or
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group
or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow
or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes
or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly
of persons,.knowing the purposes thereof -
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the
United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next
following his conviction.
If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in
this section, each shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment
by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five
years next following his conviction. (italics added).
2 64 Stat. 987,50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1959).
3 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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ment of the United States and to teach and advocate the duty and necessity of
the violent overthrow of the Government. Their convictions were affirmed on the
ground that they had been found to have engaged in the conspiracy with the intent
that such teaching and advocacy be of a principle of action and by language
reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite persons to action, and with the
intent to cause the violent overthrow of the Government as speedily as circum-
stances would permit. Subsequently, in Yates v. United States4 the Court emphasized
that a distinction must be made between espousing and teaching, on a theoretical
level, the duty and necessity 6f violent overthrow on the one hand, and illegally
advocating such overthrow on the other. To be illegal, said the Court, advocacy
must constitute incitement to action, though not necessarily to immediate action.
Those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, either
now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in something. Further, circum-
stances must reasonably justify apprehension that action will occur.5 It was settled
in Dennis and Yates that advocacy of the kind described in these cases is not con-
stitutionally protected speech.
When the Supreme Court upheld its validity in Dennis, the Smith Act became
one of the chief weapons used by the Government against the Communist movement
in the United States." But rarely has a prosecution been based on the Smith Act's
membership clause.7 Unlike other portions of the Smith Act, the membership clause
does not proscribe the forms of speech which were held in Dennis and Yates to be
not constitutionally protected. It proscribes neither the organizing of groups which
are engaged in illegal advocacy in the Dennis-Yates sense, nor illegal advocacy
itself, nor conspiring to accomplish these ends, but mere membership in an organ-
ization." The validity of the membership clause had not been tested by the Supreme
Court prior to the Scales case. Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, inferred,
in addition to the statutory requirements that the organization be engaged in
advocacy of the overthrow of the governement by violence and that defendant be
a member thereof knowing its purpose, two additional elements necessary to con-
stitute the membership offense: (1) that the defendant himself have a specific
intent to bring about violent overthrow of the government as speedily as circum-
stances would permit; and (2) that he be an "active" member, as opposed to a
nominal, passive or theoretical member. The Court pointed out that it was held
in Dennis that the requirement of specific intent was fairly to be implied in the
advocating-teaching and organizing provisions of the Smith Act, and it stated that
this reasoning applies equally to the membership clause. The "active" requirement
is fairly implied in the statute since it is doubtful that Congress intended to punish
mere nominal or formal membership so severely. There are, then, four elements
of the Smith Act's membership offense: (1) Active membership (2) in an organ-
4 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
5 The essence of the Dennis holding was that indoctrination of a group in
preparation for future violent action, as well as exhortation to immediate
action, by advocacy found to be directed to "action for the accomplish-
ment" of forcible overthrow, to violence as "a rule or principle of action,"
and employing "language of incitement," . . . is not constitutionally pro-
tected when the group is of sufficient size and cohesiveness, is sufficiently
oriented towards action, and other circumstances are such as reasonably to
justify apprehension that action will occur. Id. at 321.
6 By June 1961, some 145 persons had been indicted under the Smith Act; some 30
convictions had been finally affirmed. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1961, § 4, p. 8, col. 3.
7 Besides Scales and Noto, it seems that only in Lightfoot v. United States, 228 F.2d
861 (7th Cir. 1956), did a prosecution based solely on the membership clause progress to
the appellate level. Lightfoot reached the Supreme Court as a companion case to Scales.
350 U.S. 992. Both convictions were reversed, in Lightfoot v. United States, 355 U.S. 2 (1957)
and Scales v. United States, 355 U.S. 1 (1957), without reaching the merits. On remand,
the Government recently withdrew its charges against Lightfoot. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 16,
1961, p. 22, col. 1. Scales' second conviction was affirmed in the present case.
8 See note 1, supra.
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ization which is engaged in illegal advocacy of violent overthrow in the Dennis-
Yates sense, (3) with knowledge of the purposes thereof, and (4) with a specific
intent to bring about that purpose, i.e., violent overthrow of the government, as
speedily as circumstances permit.
Since the Smith Act's membership clause created a criminal offense the gist
of which is membership in an organization, Scales presented the Court with a close
question as to whether the membership clause offends the due process clause of
the fifth amendment,9 in that it punishes guilt by association. The Court recognized
this:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of
punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference
to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal
activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow) that relationship must be
sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order
to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Membership, without more, in an organization engaged in illegal advocacy,
it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by this Court to be such
a relationship. This claim stands, and we shall examine it ... 10
The issue as phrased by the Court was whether the relationship -between the fact
of Scales' membership in the Party and the substantive illegal conduct in which
the Party had been found to have been engaged (illegal advocacy of the type
condemned in Dennis and Yates) was substantial enough that criminal liability
could be predicated upon it. Of course, as the Court pointed out, certain associ-
ational relationships, i.e., conspiracy and complicity, are criminally punishable.
But the majority recognized that mere membership may signify no more than
assent, sympathy and moral encouragement, insufficient to be the basis of criminal
liability on the ground either of complicity or of conspiracy. Yet the Court held
that the Smith Act's membership clause did not offend due process, since, as inter-
preted, it reached only active members having a specific intent to bring about
violent overthrow, and so did not proscribe mere nominal membership unac-
companied by significant action facilitating the organization's illegal activities or
by an agreement to promote such activities.
Having thus met Scales' due process arguments, the Court quickly disposed
of his first amendment claim. Noting that it had been settled in Dennis that the
type of advocacy in which the Communist Party had been found to have been
engaged in Scales was not constitutionally protected speech, and that combination
to promote such advocacy was not such association as is protected by the first
amendment, the Court stated:
We can discern no reason why membership, when it constitutes a purpose-
ful form of complicity in a group engaging in this same forbidden ad-
vocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees
of that Amendment."
The result of the Scales decision is that criminal liability is predicated neither
on conspiracy nor on complicity, but upon "active" membership. In point of fact,
Scales was indeed an active member of the Party. He was the Chairman of the
North and South Carolina Districts of the Party, was active in recruiting new
members, promoted the education, at secret Party schools, of selected young mem-
bers, and was a director of one such school. Conceivably, where a person is as
active in an organization found to be engaged in illegal advocacy in the Dennis-
Yates sense as was Scales in the Communist Party, and where such person shares
with the organization a specific intent to achieve the same unlawful end, that person
might well be convicted of conspiracy to promote that unlawful end or of complicity
in facilitating the organization's illegal activities. But Scales requires neither of
these offenses to be charged or proved in order to convict under the membership
9 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law. ... "
10 367 U.S. at 224. (footnote omitted.)
11 Id. at 229.
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clause. "Active" membership alone must be proved, along with the requisite specific
intent and knowledge. This aspect of the decision impelled Mr. Justice Douglas to
dissent:
There is here no charge of conspiracy, no charge of any overt act to over-
throw the Government by force and violence, no charge of any other
criminal act. The charge is being a "member" of the Communist Party,
"well-knowing" that it advocated the overthrow of the Government by
force and violence, "said defendant intending to bring about such over-
throw by force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit."
This falls far short of a charge of conspiracy. Conspiracy rests not in
intention alone but in agreement with one or more others to promote an
unlawful project. . . No charge of any kind or sort of agreement hitherto
embraced in the concept of a conspiracy is made here.
We legalize today guilt by association, sending a man to prison when
he committed no unlawful act....
The case is not saved by showing that petitioner was an active member.
None of the activity constitutes a crime.' 2
Not only does the Scales opinion not require that the member's activity con-
stitute a crime other than membership itself, but it does not even require that his
activity facilitate such other crime. The Court seems to have proceeded on the
premise that any active member will necessarily facilitate the unlawful activities
in which his organization is found to be engaged. This premise may well be the
fact in some cases, especially where the member is as active as Scales was. But on
the other hand, where an organization engages in both legal and illegal activities,
as does the Communist Party, a member's activity, even though he shares with the
organization a specific intent to accomplish the same unlawful end, may not sub-
stantially facilitate any of the organization's illegal activities. Thus an active member
who has not been found to be either conspirator or accomplice, or to be guilty of
any crime save membership in an organization thought to be evil, is criminally
liable under the membership clause. Since Scales, in fact, was a most active member
of the Party it may be said that on the facts of the case the Court has held that
membership is punishable only when of such character as to in fact facilitate and
further illegal advocacy in the Dennis-Yates sense. But the Court provided no
express definition of the kind of activity required for conviction. As to the amount
of activity required, the Court did not more than to approve as adequate the
instructions given to the jury in Scales' trial: "To be active he must have devoted
all, or a substantial part, of his time and efforts to the Party."' 3
The Court reversed the conviction under the membership clause in the Noto
case, Mr. Justice Harlan again writing the majority opinion, but did not reach
the question of the sufficiency of Noto's activity. 14 Noto therefore sheds no additional
light on the issue of the quality and amount of activity on the part of a member
which shall be necessary for conviction under the membership clause.
The Scales decision may well affect state courts' ideas of due process in
prosecutions for sedition against the state.' 5 If the federal government may, without
offending due process, punish "active" membership in an organization which is
engaged in illegal advocacy of violent overthrow, presumably a state may also
punish such "active" membership, where the illegal advocacy is directed against
the state government.
Apart from constitutional grounds, Scales made a strong statutory argument
12 Id. at 263-64.
13 Id. at 255 n.29.
14 Noto's conviction was reversed on the ground that the Government had not proved
that the Communist Party, the organization of which Noto had been charged with being
a member, had been engaged in illegal Dennis-Yates advocacy during the period named
in the indictment.
15 The power of the states to proceed with such prosecutions was held in Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) not to have been superseded by the Smith Act or.by Pennsylvania
v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), interpreting the latter case as having held that the Smith
Act supersedes the enforcibility of only those state acts which proscribe advocacy of violent
overthrow of the federal government.
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for reversal. He claimed that §4(f) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, which
is Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950,10 constituted a pro tanto repeal of
the membership clause of the Smith Act by excluding from the reach of the clause
membership in any Communist organization. Section 4(f) provides, in part:
Neither the holding of office nor membership in any Communist
organization by any person shall constitute per se a violation of subsection
(a) or subsection (c) of this section or of any other criminal statute.... 17
The Court rejected Scales' claim that a fair and literal reading of §4(f) gives
rise to the conclusion that it repealed the membership clause, but Scales presented
an additional argument, summed up by the Court as follows:
The core of the Internal Security Act is its registration provisions (§§ 7
and 8), requiring disclosure of membership in the Communist Party fol-
lowing a valid final determination of the Subversive Activities Control
Board as to the status of the Party. . . . The registration requirement
would be rendered nugatory by a plea of self-incrimination and could
only be saved by a valid grant of immunity from prosecution by reason of
such disclosure. However, the immunity provided by the second sentence
of § 4(f) is insufficient, in that it forbids only the use of the "fact of
. . . registration" as evidence in any future prosecution, and not also its
employment as a "lead" to other evidence. See Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U.S. 547; Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332. Therefore to
effectuate the congressional purpose it becomes necessary to consider the
first sentence of § 4(f) a pro tanto repealer of the membership clause
of the Smith Act, thereby assuring effective immunity from the criminal
consequences of registration in this instance.' s
The Court disagreed with Scales' contention, however, and held that instead of
repealing the membership clause, §4(f) modified it - in the direction of con-
stitutionality.'0 The dissenters, speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan, agreed with
Scales that Congress had intended by §4(f) to extend immunity from prosecution
for any membership in a Communist organization, 0 lest the registration provisions
of the Subversive Activities Control Act "be wrecked on the rock of the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 21
In support of its denial of Scales' contention concerning §4(f) the majority
noted:
16 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98, 811-26 (1959).
17 SACA of 1950, § 4(f), 64 Stat. 992, 50 U.S.C. § 783(f) (1959).
18 367 U.S. at 210.
19 Although we think that the membership clause on its face goes beyond
making mere Party membership a violation, in that it requires a showing
both of illegal Party purposes and of a member's knowledge of such pur-
poses, we regard the first sentence of § 4(f) as a clear warrant for con-
struing the clause as requiring not only knowing membership, but active
and purposive membership, purposive that is as to the organization's
criminal ends. . . . By its terms, then, subsection (f) does not effect a
pro tanto repeal of themembership clause; at most it modifies it. 367
U.S. at 209-210.
20 If the phraseology were that immunity is extended only to "membership
per se," there might be support for the argument that the immunity granted
by § 4(f) extends-only to nominal membership, excluding the type of
active membership which we have here. But the statute does not say
"membership per se." . . . The kind of membership given immunity is
not restricted. It may be nominal, short-term, long-term, dues-paying, non-
dues-paying, inactive, or active membership Every type of membership
is included. . . . When Congress said that membership "shall not con-
stitute per se" a violation of any criminal statute, it meant that additional
conduct besides membership, whatever its nature, is necessary to constitute
a violation. Only by transposing per se in § 4(f) and making it modify
-"membership" can the Court's argument be made plausible. That en-
tails a substantial revision of the Act and a drastic dilution of rights
of immunity wihih have been granted by it. 367 U.S. at 286-87.
21 Id. at 280.
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[Tihe thrust of petitioner's argument cannot be limited to the mem-
bership clause, for it is equally applicable to any prosecution under any
of a host of criminal provisions where Communist Party membership
might provide an investigatory lead as to the elements of the crime.22
This point, not discussed at all by the dissenters, presents a serious problem. The
dissenting justices cite Counselman v. Hitchcock,23 and Blau v. United States2 4
for the proposition that a Communist could not be compelled to register, since
under the membership clause that would constitute admission of a crime, or would
provide a link in the chain of evidence necessary to proof of crime, or would be
an investigative lead to other incriminating evidence. But it seems that even if the
membership clause were repealed, a member of the Party would remain equally
justified in refusing to register, on the ground that registration would provide a link
or an investigative lead which would tend to incriminate him under the other
Smith Act offenses or under offenses created by the Subversive Activities Control
Act itself.2 s Yet this argument does not so much seem to support the holding of
the Scales majority on the effect of §4(f) as to point out a serious self-incrimination
problem in the enforcement of the registration order which was affirmed in Com-
munist Party of the United States of America v. Subversive Activities Control
Board. The Scales decision does aggravate the problem, of course, since registra-
tion admits membership (and registration by an officer admits relatively active
membership), and membership itself is the gist of the membership clause offense.
The heart of the Subversive Activities Control Act is the provision in §7 that
organizations which are found by the Subversive Activities Control Board to be
either Communist-action or Communist-front organizations must register with
the Attorney General. In CPUSA v. SACB the Court affirmed an order of the
Board requiring the Communist Party to register as a Communist-action organi-
zation. The Act provides that registration as such an organization shall -be accom-
panied by the filing of a registration statement, in such form and manner as the
Attorney General shall prescribe, containing, among other things, the name and
address of each individual who was an officer or member of the organization at
any time during the twelve months preceding the filing of the statement.26 The
Attorney General has ordered that such registration-statement be made on Form
ISA-1,27 which requires that the statement be signed by the partners, officers,
directors, and members of the governing body of the registering organization. If
the organization fails to submit its registration statement within 30 days after a
final order to do so, it is the duty of certain officers to file the statement; 28 if these
officers fail to do so, individual members must then register themselves.29 Heavy
penalties are provided for failure to register or file on the part of organization,
officer or individual member, and each day of failure constitutes a separate offense.30
The self-incrimination problems involved in these provisions are obvious.
Writing for the majority in CPUSA, Mr. Justice Frankfurter restricted the
decision solely to the requirement that the Party register, holding that questions
concerning registration by officers or individual members (as well as those concerning
the validity of the restrictions and disabilities which become effective upon regis-
tration as against the organization and its members) were premature. The Court
held that the requirement of registration and its attendant disclosure did not offend
the first amendment. The Court further held, and on this point split five to four,
22 Id. at 211. (footnote omitted.)
23 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
24 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
25 SACA of 1950, §§ 4-6, 64 Stat. 991, 50 U.S.C. §§ 783-85 (1959).
26 SAGA of 1950, § 7(d), 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 786(d) (1959).
27 28 C.F.R. § 11.200 (Supp. 1961).
28 SAGA of 1950, § 7(h), 64 Stat. 995, 50 U.S.C. § 786(h) (1959). Implemented
by the Attorney General at 28 C.F.R. 11.205 (Supp. 1961).
29 SAGA of 1950, § 8, 64 Stat. 995, 50 U.S.C. § 787 (1959).
30 SAGA of 1950, § 15, 64 Stat. 1002, 50 U.S.C. § 794 (1959).
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that the contention that the officers who must sign the Attorney General's Form
ISA-I are forced thereby to incriminate themselves was also prematurely raised.
These officers, the Court stated, either might comply with the registration require-
ment or, in lieu of furnishing the required information, could file statements claim-
ing the self-incrimination privilege. "Whatever proceeding may be taken after and
if the privilege is claimed will provide an adequate forum for litigation of that
issue." 3'
Expressing the view that adjudication of this claim of the privilege against
self-incrimination made on behalf of the officers required to sign Form ISA-I
should not be put off to a later date, Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in part, stated
that future claim of the privilege would be self-defeating because, "if the admission
of officership in the Communist Party is incriminating, then a claim of privilege
by name would amount to the very same admission .... 32 Although a claim of
the self-incrimination privilege may always arouse suspicion, the Justice felt that
"registration is unique because of the initial burden it puts on the potential defen-
dant to come forward and claim the privilege."3 s Mr. Justice Douglas, also of the
opinion that the self-incrimination issue was ripe for adjudication, expressed the
view that the fifth amendment not only prevents compelling Party officers to sign
the registration statement, but also prevents the compulsory disclosure of member-
ship in the Party, which would be the effect of filing a statement containing names
of all members.34
The Smith Act and the Subversive Activities Control Act do not proscribe by
name either the Communist Party or membership in the Party. Yet as a practical
matter both are aimed at Communism. When, as a result of a finding that the
Party is a Communist-action organization, a person is forced to register the Party
as one of its officers, or his name is included on a membership list which the Govern-
ment requires the Party to file, he is threatened with prosecution under the Smith
Act. He is not thus proved to have committed any crime, but membership in the
Party is "the start of every prosecution whether it be for active 'membership' as in
Scales . . . or for conspiracy to teach the doctrine, as in Dennis. . . ."35 If the
person were asked if he were a member, he could refuse to answer on the ground
that his answer would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed in prosecutions
for violation of the Smith Act."6 It seems that, in the words of Mr. Justice Douglas,
"Congress (past or present) is attempting to have its cake and eat it too."3 If
registration and disclosure are to be compelled in the interest of bringing out into
the open the Communist movement within the United States and protecting the
public from unwitting collaboration with it, the fifth amendment demands corre-
sponding immunity from criminal prosecution. Perhaps the Court will rule, after
further litigation, that registration and disclosure do indeed demand corresponding
immunity. But its failure to do so in CPUSA has left the law, not to mention the
Communist Party and its officers, in an unnecessary state of uncertainty.
Paul J. Driscoll
31 367 U.S. at 107.
32 Id. at 195.
33 Id. at 196.
34 At the time this article was written the Communist Party had not yet registered. TheParty obtained a stay of the .PUSA v. SACB decision until the Court could pass on theParty's petition for rehearing, but the petition was denied. Wall St. Journal, Oct. 10, 1961,p. 1, col. 3. The deadline then set for registration of the Party was November 20, 1961.
Party officials had indicated their intention not to register - at least not to the required
extent of disclosing the names of members. The Department of justice had disclosed thatif the Party failed to register it would move against the Party itself, which would be subject
to a $10,000 fine for each day of failure to register.
35 CPUSA v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 181. (Footnote omitted.)
36 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
37 OPUSA v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 190.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION - REFUSAL
To ANSWER PERTINENT QUESTIONS OF AUTHORIZED COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY AS
BASIS FOR DENIAL OF ADMISSION TO BAR OR DISBARMENT NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS DENIAL OF FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES. - The California Business and
Professions Code requires that applicants for admission to the bar must be of
good moral character and may not advocate the overthrow of the Government
of the United States or of California by force or violence or other unconstitutional
means. The petitioner, when before the Committee investigating applicants for
admission to the bar, refused to answer any questions concerning past Com-
munist affiliations on the grounds that such questions were beyond the authority
of the Committee, that the investigation was precluded -by an earlier disposition
of the case, and that under the protection of the first amendment the answers
to the questions were unnecessary. The Supreme Court of the United States held:
the investigation and questions were within the authority of the Committee and
pertinent thereto. The protection of the first amendment did not excuse the
applicant from answering. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36
(1961).
In Illinois, in addition to the possession of good moral character, the appli-
cant must conscientiously swear to support the Constitution of the United States
and of Illinois. In circumstances similar to those above described, petitioner re-
fused to answer certain questions asked by the Committee on Fitness and Char-
acter. In the face of uncontroverted evidence tending to show applicant's good
moral character and fitness, the Committee denied certification because his re-
fusal to answer its questions obstructed a complete investigation. On certiorari
before the Supreme Court, held: absent any arbitrary or discriminatory action,
the Committee's procedure was not inconsistent with the Constitution and the
case turned on the rule of Konigsberg. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
The third case to be treated in this comment differs from the other two in
that the sanction imposed upon the refusal to answer relevant questions was dis-
barment. A Judicial Inquiry considering unethical practices in New York City
sought certain information from the petitioner which he refused to give on the
basis of the state's privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court held:
there was no violation of the due process or equal protection provisions of the
United States Constitution. The Court's review was said to be limited to those
questions. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
Konigsberg is not a stranger to the Supreme Court. He was before the Court
in 1957 and it was then determined that he could not be denied admission to the
bar on the basis of failing to satisfy the statutory pre-requisites, where the record
of the Committee hearings showed a wealth of evidence indicating that he met
the state's demands. It was held that testimony tending to prove that he had
been a member of the Communist Party, that he had criticized certain public
officials and their policies, and that he refused to answer questions relating to Com-
munist affiliations, could not justify a conclusion by the Committee that he did
not come up to the statutory standard required for admission.'
The Supreme Court in the earlier decision did not decide whether the mere
refusal to answer was a valid basis on which to impose the sanction.2
These three cases are similar in that each involves the refusal to answer ques-
tions as a basis for imposing a sanction.3 The validity of this foundation for the
action taken is not solely a question of a duty of the person asked, but also of the
power or authority of the Committee to ask the questions. The extent to which
one must respond to the inquiries of another depends on the extent to which the
1 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
2 Ibid.
3 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366
U.S. 82 (1961); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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answer demanded is a legitimate concern of the one seeking the information. To
say that it is the business of the bar association to know whether a prospective
member is a Communist, or whether a present member is an "ambulance chaser,"
does not completely solve the problem. The ultimate concern in this respect of the
bar association and of the judiciary is. that of having fit individuals practice law.
The fitness of an individual in turn' depends on his qualities as a person and upon
his devotion to the institutions on which this country is based.
The power of government to investigate, like the power to tax, is the power
to destroy. Therefore, it is essential that the liberties of individuals be protected
and that the power of the government to investigate be confined to those matters
properly within governmental concern. For this reason the Supreme Court, in
Watkins v. United States, struck down the conviction of one accused of violating
a statute making it a criminal offense to obstruct the -investigation of a Congres-
sional Committee. 4 In that case the authorization of the House of Representatives
inadequately defined what it was that was to concern the Un-American Activities
Committee. The party who was asked the questions was unable to determine the
relation of the particular question to the area of investigation.
Similarly, when the legislature of New Hampshire attempted to make the
attorney-general a one man committee to investigate subversive persons and or-
ganizations, the Supreme Court held that the rigors of due process demanded
that the conviction for contempt for refusal to answer be reversed because the
area to be investigated was insufficiently described. The scope of the definition
in the statute was broad enough to include an investigation into conduct remotely
related to actual subversion performed independent of any conscious intent to par-
take in such activity.5 In such a situation conviction for refusal to answer such
questions would be a deprivation of first amendment guarantees.
Two years later the Court set out what must be shown in order that in-
vestigatory functions may be carried out without violating the Constitution. In
Barenblatt v. United States6 and in Uphaus v. Wyman,7 it was held sufficient
that the governmental committee be shown to be validly authorized to investigate
a given area and that the particular qiuestions be shown to be pertinent to the
inquiry. In each of the three cases under discussion it appeared that the investiga-
tion had been validly authorized and that the questions asked were relevant thereto.8
It has been held that mere membership in the Communist Party at some
past date when the Party was allowed on the ballot and not viewed in a distinct
light is not a basis on which membership in the bar may be constitutionally denied.'
rherefore it is relevant to ask what would the result have been if the petitioners
in Konigsberg and in Anastaplo had answered in the affirmative the questions
concerning Communist affiliations? The dissent of Justice Black in the second
Konigsberg case contains the clear answer - this would not be a conititutional
basis of exclusion."0 Such an answer would, however, initiate a line of inquiry as to
the nature of the membership. This, as is pointed out by the record of the Com-
mittee proceedings in Anastaplo,1" would have a bearing on the applicant's position
regarding violent overthrow of the government and the required oath. In this
context it would be a preliminary question to a relevant line of inquiry. In the
event the applicant had responded in the affirmative, it would then become in-
cumbent upon the Committee to attempt to determine the nature of the member-
4 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
5 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
6 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
7 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
8 CAL. Bus. & PROF. COD- § 6046; ILL. Rsv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd 1951), Ch. 110, par.
259.58, Rule 58, § IX; Ch. 13, par. 4; N.Y. Judiciary Laws § 90.
9 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
10 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, note 3 supra.
11 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 92, n. 14.
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ship and the effect thereof on the applicant's ability to comply with the statutory
requirements for admission.
In the event that the applicant answered the question to the effect that he
was not a Communist, then it would appear that, if contradicted or impeached,
the credibility of his answer would come into issue as bearing on his good moral
character.1 In this context the question would also be relevant to an authorized
investigation.
In each case the investigation was authorized by either the mandate of the
legislature or the rules of practice of the judiciary. 1 In each instance the questions
asked went to the crux of the investigation, i.e., the fitness of the individual to
practice law. 14 Refusal to answer the questions was grounded in the first amend-
ment in two of the cases,' 5 and on a state privilege against self-incrimination in
the third.16 The first amendment problem was resolved in favor of the states by
application of the so-called "balancing test." The state-privilege-against-self-in-
crimination issue was determined as not extending to this type of situation in view
of an attorney's capacity as an officer of the court and a court's historic supervisory
and regulatory powers over the attorneys practicing before it.'7 So long as due
process is not violated, the state may define the extent of its privilege as it sees
fit.'
s
The use of the balancing test, whereby the interest of the state in having the
desired information is weighed against the individual's interest in unrestricted
liberty to say what he wants and to associate with whom he pleases, has resulted
in sharp conflict between the majority and the other members of the Court. While
the use of the test is definitely the rule,' 9 Justice Black makes an incisive argument
against it. He relies heavily on the history of events leading to the drafting of the
Constitution and the evils which the framers sought to preclude. It would appear
that the basic objection to the test is, as he points out, its extension to its logical
limit.20 This would be to say that there is nothing in which the state does not have
an interest superior to that of the individual. Note that the subordination of the
individual's interests to the general interest is no stranger to the law - nuisances
are abated or not on the basis of their effect on the common good. However, the
"balancing test" has the capacity to make an empty shell of the first amendment,
and has the unhappy feature of making constitutional decisions turn, to an ever
greater degree, on the predilections of the Court's membership at a particular
time.
The absolutism, which Justice Black says was really the intention of the
Founding Fathers in regard to the freedoms within the amendment," does not
appear to be the solution. Despite the abhorrence of prior restraint, seditious libel,
and licensing legislation which the members of the Constitutional Convention
12 Ibid.
13 Note 8, supra.
14 Note 3, supra. In the Konigsberg case and in the Anastaplo case the questions refused
answers went to the applicants' devotion to the law and its process for orderly change; in
Cohen they went to the existence of unethical practices.
15 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) ; In re Anastaplo, 366
U.S. 82 (1961).
16 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
17 Ibid.
18 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78(1908).
19 Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); National Ass'n For Advancement
of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957).
20 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36(1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S.
82 (1961).
21 See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S.
36 (1961).
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undoubtedly had, it seems unlikely that their distaste was so great as to lead them
to remove all limitation from the right of free speech. As with the "balancing test,"
the literal interpretation appears unsatisfactory when forced to its logical conclusion.
The "clear and present danger" test expounded by Justice Holmes22 is a
valid basis on which to determine problems arising in the interpretation of the
first amendment. In effect this test amounts to a middle ground between the
"absolutism" theory and the logical extension of the "balancing test." What the
"clear and present danger" test really says is that constitutional protection extends
to a certain degree and thereafter it does not. The line-of demarcation is fixed at
the point where there is found to exist as a matter of fact, a "clear and present
danger that the speech will bring about evils which Congress has a right to prevent."
The value of this approach to questions involving the first amendment is the
additional certainty inherent in the test. Whether or not the protection of the
Constitution covers the particular expression depends on the answer to a factual
question. It does not depend on what weight is accorded the state's interest in hav-
ing the information as opposed to the weight that is to be accorded to the in-
dividual's interest in suppressing the information. The "clear and present danger"
test removes the judicial weighing and in its place employs a factual question.
In Cohen v. Hurley, the majority attempted to distinguish between the rights
of the petitioner as a citizen at large and the rights of the petitioner as an at-
torney in light of his responsibilities as an officer of the court. 23 This distinction,
as the Court implies, is based not on whether due process applies to lawyers, but
rather on the definition of due process. Due process amounts to those procedural
safeguards as are necessary to comport with fundamental fairness. What is re-
quired by fundamental fairness is to be determined on the basis of the situation
presented, in light of what procedural safeguards have been historically required.
Justice Black complains 4 that lawyers are hereby singled out as a group, and
that more stringent requirements are applied to that group than are applied to
other people. Thus he concludes that under such a test lawyers are denied due
process and equal protection. It appears however that if, as is the law, due process
is determined by what procedures are fundamentally fair in the particular situa-
tion, in light of historical requirements, then due process in one situation does not
require the same procedures that it may in another.
What process is required in the particular situation becomes the next con-
cern. Should a judicial inquiry be able to impose such a severe sanction as dis-
barment because of failure to. respond to relevant questions? .
The courts have long been recognized as having supervisory powers over
those attorneys who practice before them.25 This dates from the days of the early
English common law. That some of this supervisory responsibility was delegated
to the Inns of the Court is well recognized. In this country the responsibility of
the Inns is shouldered by the bar associations and the courts.
Since attorneys are recognized as standing in a special relationship to the court
and because of the disciplinary authority that is hist6rically a prerogative of the
judiciary, it appears that, that which is required in these circumstances comports
with due process.
The California statute provides that "no person who advocates the over-
throw of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by
force, or violence, or other unconstitutional means shall be a member of the bar."26
The basis for the petitioner's exclusion in Konigsberg was that he refused to answer
pertinent questions put to him by an authorized Committee and thereby obstructed
its investigation. The aim of the investigation was to determine the fitness of the
22 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
23 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
24 See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
25 People ex. rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
26 CAL. Bus. & PROF. Com. § 6064.1.
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candidate, as has been previously mentioned. It is suggested by the dissents in
Konigsberg that the result of the denial on the ground stated has the effect of
shifting the burden of proving non-advocacy to the applicant. This appears not to
be the case because, as the majority points out, the holding is couched in terms of
obstruction, and thus implies that the Committee has the responsibility to show
advocacy rather than the applicant to demonstrate non-advocacy.2 7 Further, there
is a basis for the position that this is not the type of case at which the rule of
Speiser v. Randall is directed.28
It would appear that significance of these cases lies in their further indication
of the existing judicial climate. After the decision in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,29
it appeared that state sedition laws were no longer of any effect because of the
dominance of the federal legislation in that field. As a result of Uphaus v. Wyman,30
it is now understood that the impact of Pennsylvania v. Nelson was to render such
state statutes invalid insofar as they attempted to proscribe sedition against the
federal government, but not as such statutes apply to sedition against the state.
Similarly, due process was held to have been violated in Slochower v. Board
of Higher Education,' where a professor was dismissed from his position because
of a claim of privilege based on the fifth amendment before a Congressional
Committee. Two years later the Court upheld the discharge of a school teacher
over a due process objection.32 The discharge relied on a statutory definition of
incompetency which included the refusal to answer relevant questions. A like
situation arose in regard to a public employee and the Court found no violation
of due process.23
When the Konigsberg case was first decided it remained uncertain whether
a sanction could be attached to a refusal to answer the questions of a bar asso-
ciation committee relating to Communist affiliations. This was especially so in
light of the Court's holding in the Schware case. 4 The cases treated in this
comment indicate the state of the law in that regard, and in relation to other
questions relevant to a valid investigation wherein answers were refused. The
previous uncertainty has been removed. William E. Kelly
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEizuan - EVIDENCE SEIZED BY STATE
POLICE OFFICERS DURING SEARCH OF RENTED PREMISES IN ABSENCE OF TENANT
AND WITHOUT A WARRANT BUT WITH LANDLORD'S CONSENT HELD INADMISSIBLE
IN A FEDERAL PROSECUTION. - Chapman was arrested and convicted for the illegal
operation of an unlicensed distillery' in a rented house. The landlord visited the
rented premises one Sunday and noticed a strong odor of mash emanating from the
house. He informed local police of his observations and they accompanied him to
the house. Receiving no response to knocks and blocked from a view of the interior
by drawn shades, the officers, with the landlord's permission, entered the house
through an unlocked window. Upon entering, the officers found a complete distillery
and sent for federal agents. Chapman was arrested when he arrived at the house.
27 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
28 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527 (1958). The doctrine enunciated by Speiser v.
Randall is that requiring a taxpayer, in order to qualify for a state tax exemption, to sustain
the burden of proof that he did not advocate the violent overthrow of the government vio-
lates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
29 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
30 360 U.S. 22 (1959).
31 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
32 Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
33 Nelson v. Los Angeles County, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Cf. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S.
468 (1957).
34 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
1 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 5601, 5606.
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Thereafter the federal agents arrived and took custody of Chapman and samples
of the mash. Neither the local nor the federal officers had warrants of any kind.
Chapman's motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the search was denied by
the trial court. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. State police officers' search
of rented premises, without a search warrant, in the absence of tenant but with
the consent of the landlord, was unlawful and evidence seized during such search
was inadmissible in federal prosecution. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961).
The Government did not contend that the search and seizure met the standards
of the fourth amendment. It relied, instead, on the alleged common law rule
that a landlord has an absolute right to enter the rented premises to view waste.
The Court rejected this argument because the Government failed to cite any cases
on point and because of its own reluctance to import into the area of search and-
seizure the "subtle" and "largely historical" distinctions of property law.2 The
Court also refused to find that the landlord had complied with the provisions of
a Georgia statute.3 It said that, before the entry, the landlord did not know that
the premises were being used for the illegal operation of a distillery. It noted, too,
that he had not exercised his statutory option to forfeit the tenancy for such a
cause.4 Having dismissed these contentions, the Court rested its decision on the law
of search and seizure.
In the eighteenth century, English courts issued "general warrants"' which
permitted certain officers to conduct searches for certain illegally possessed goods
in any place where they might be found. The broad and onerous scope of police
intrusion which resulted was brought to a halt by Entick v. Carrington,6 which
declared these general warrants invalid. The colonists in America had also experi-
enced the burden of the general warrant.7 Against this historical background, the
fourth amendment to the Constitution" was framed and adopted. The amendment
was intended to protect the security of the individual and his home against the
power of the federal government; more particularly, it was general warrants that
the framers had in mind.9 One significant limitation on this "right of privacy" was
deemed necessary. A limited search could be authorized by a judicial warrant
specifically describing the premises to be searched and the items sought. A warrant
could be issued only on a showing of probably cause. From this qualification it can
be deduced that a search and seizure should be invalid unless a warrant authorizes
it,1 barring only exceptions justified by "absolute necessity.""
2 365 U.S. at 617.
3 The unlawful manufacture, sale, or keeping for sale or disposition of any
of the liquors and beverages mentioned in section 58-101., contrary to the
law of the State shall, at the option of the landlord, work a forfeiture of
the rights of any lessee or tenant under any lease or contract for rent of
the premises where such unlawful act is performed by the lessee or tenant,
or by any agent, servant, clerk or employee of the lessee or tenant with the
latter's knowledge or permission. GA. CODE § 58-106 (1933).
4 365 U.S. at 617.
5 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-630 (1885); United States v. Kirschen-
blatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
6 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
7 Paxton's Case, Quincey 51 (Mass. 1761).
8 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
9 United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
10 See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1945); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 304-306 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913).
11 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924); Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa 101
(1876); Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482 (1867).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The freedom of a person's house from search without a warrant not incident
to a valid arrest, had received no judicial explication until the case of Agnello v.
United States. It was there said that "belief, however well founded, that an article
sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search
without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause."' 12 This seemed to be the rule until 1937
when the Court, instead of repeating what it had said in Agnello, spoke in terms
of time and the practicability of obtaining a search warrant' 3 Although the Court
held in this instance that the search and seizure without a warrant was illegal and
therefore that the admission into evidence of the fruits of that search was error,
there remained a hint that matters of convenience in obtaining a warrant would be
relevant.'
4
Ten years later, the Court stated that "it is a cardinal rule that, in seizing
goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants
whenever reasonably practicable."'" In saying this, the Court seemed to equate
"unreasonable" searches with those where the arresting officers might reasonably
have been expected to obtain a search warrant. Searches were said to be "reason-
able" not only where made with a warrant, or where the lack of a warrant was
excused by absolute necessity, but also where a warrant could not have been got
without reasonable practicability.
Faced with a case in which police had arrested the accused and then had
thoroughly searched his office for illegal matter, without a search warrant, the
Court has declared that "what is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula. The Constitution does not define what are 'unreasonable' searches
and, regrettably, in our* discipline we have no ready litmus-paper test.""' In thus
laying aside the history behind the fourth amendment, the Court held that "the
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts
and circumstances - the total atmosphere of the case.' 7 In setting down this test,
the Court explicitly overruled the practicability test of Trupiano.'8 The Court had
found a way in which it might say that a search without a warrant, not incident
to a valid arrest, was reasonable and without regard for the element of absolute
necessity. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's vigorous dissent pointed out the shift which
the majority was making away from the historical meaning of "unreasonable"
searches.' 9 Prime importance was attached to the circumstances under which the
search was made. Two results seem to flow from Rabinowitz: (1) because of the
lack of any real criteria, each case will be decided on an ad hoc basis; and (2),
more importantly, this uncertainty in the law could, in many instances, allow the
Court to find that the realities of effective law enforcement outweigh the citizen's
interest in his privacy. The tendency of the Court to do so has been recently
indicated. 20
In deciding Chapman, the Court examined the facts from two angles. By
deeming Taylor v. United States" and Johnson v. United States22 "closely rele-
vant," 23 the Court followed the line of reasoning which had led to the holding in
Trupiano. It was emphasized in both Taylor and Johnson that warrants could
12 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
13 Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
14 Id. at 6.
15 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1947).
16 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
17 Id. at 66.
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 68-86.
20 Chapman at 623; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950).
21 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
22 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
23 365 U.S. at 618.
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have been secured. The element of time was mentioned frequently in those deci-
sions. On the other hand, had the Court examined the "total atmosphere" of the
factual situation in Chapman, it might well have found that the search was reason-
able.
It is thought that the lack of clarity which Justice Frankfurter speaks of in
his concurring opinion 24 is produced by the concurrence of two factors; (1) the
Court did not explicitly rely on Trupiano, although the line of reasoning followed
in the first part of the opinion did proceed from the standpoint of determining
whether or not it was reasonably practicable for the Georgia police to have armed
themselves with a search warrant and (2) the Court refused to find that, under
the circumstances, that is, the total atmosphere of the case, the search could be
termed reasonable. In short, the majority seemed to ignore the fact that Trupiano
was overruled by United States v. Rabinowit. 25 Compounding the confusion, the
Court rested its decision on the reasoning of Johnson 2 which was weakened by
Rabinowitz. By its implicit recognition of the test in Trupiano and its silence as to
the status of the holding in Rabinowitz, the Court posed a dilemma for the lower
courts and law enforcement officers concerning the elements which must be con-
sidered by them in deciding when a search, not incident to a valid arrest, is per-
missible without a warrant. The question of whether the Court will apply the
unreasonableness test of Trupiano or of Rabinowitz, or a combination of the two,
plainly presents itself for consideration by police and the lower courts. It is thought
that at least fragments of Trupiano remain to puzzle those who need clarity.
Perhaps it would be wise to ask whether or not a test or formula for deciding
the validity of a search without a warrant not incident to a valid arrest is appro-
priate. Unaccompanied by tests, the meaning of the words, "unreasonable searches
and seizures," is understandable in the light of history.27 The citizen's interest in
security from police interference is certainly regarded as paramount. This interest
is to be served by k liberal interpretation of -the fourth amendment by the courts
in favor of the right to be free from undue police intrusion and surveillance.28
However, any formula which is devised to determine the reasonableness of a search
without warrant must, of necessity, inhibit the right of the individual to his privacy.
The tests contained in Trupiano and Rabinowitz are good examples of the gradual
encroachments upon the citizen's privacy which can result. To the recognized
exception of absolute necessity, Trupiano added the element of the time which
authorities had to secure a warrant. The Court in Rabinowitz said that considera-
tions other than time were also important and that "some flexibility will be accorded
law officers engaged in daily battle with criminals for whose restraint criminal laws
are essential." 29 These decisions reveal the understandable concern of the Court
for effective law enforcement, but the case for efficiency should not be allowed to
endanger substantial private rights. Warrants are required in order to prevent the
police from indiscriminately rummaging through the private effects of an individual
before the reasons for such an undertaking have been fully presented to a magis-
trate for his detached and disinterested judgment on the need for it.30 Without
this orderly process, enthusiastic law enforcement has been shown to seriously
interfere with the citizen's security and privacy."'
The Court in the present case has indeed created a "quagmire 3 2 but the
24 Ibid.
25 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
26 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
27 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
28 United States v, Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 56 (1950); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298, 304 (1920).
29 339 U.S. at 65.
30 Ibid.
31 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1947); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1947).
32 365 U.S. at 622 (dissenting opinion).
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questions which remain unanswered may provide the Court with the opportunity
to re-examine the wiseness of- formulating tests to distinguish the reasonable from
the unreasonable search. Tests fulfill a desire for clarity but it is also felt that they
move away from the historical reasons for the fourth amendment and invade the
domain of privacy by increasing the number of instances when search of a person's
house without a warrant and not incident to a valid arrest can be conducted.
However, it is thought that, if some kind of standard is desirable in order to guide
the lower courts and police, the test set down in Trupiano hues closer to the excep-
tion of necessity than does the rule contained in Rabinowitz.
George W. Vander Vennet, Jr.
CONTRACTS - THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY - DONEE BENEFICIARY MAY EN-
FORCE INSURANCE CONTRACT - Before boarding a plane to take aerial photographs
for the defendant, Physicians News Service, Inc., plaintiff's husband had entered
into an alleged oral contract with the defendant, whereby the latter was to pro-
cure, at its expense, a $50,000 insurance policy on his life, with the plaintiff as
the sole beneficiary. While performing the contract, plaintiff's husband was killed
when the plane crashed. The defendant did not purchase the insurance policy
and the petitioner sued as a third party beneficiary. She had a $50,000 verdict but
the trial court held her to be a mere incidental beneficiary, since the defendant
had undertaken no duty to the petitioner, and granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint. Weiner v. Physicians News Service, Inc., 27 Misc. 2d 470,
211 N.Y.S. 2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1960). On appeal, held: judgment modified on the
grounds that petitioner was a donee beneficiary and entitled to recover. Yet, a
new trial was granted, since the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court thought that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Weiner v.
Physicians News Service, Inc., 214 N.Y.S. 2d 474 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
Professor Corbin1 has defined a donee beneficiary as a "third party to whom a
promised performance comes without cost to himself as a donation from the
promisee." Professor Williston 2 has adopted the description employed by the Re-
statement of Contracts 3 which states that:
(1) Where the performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person
other than the promisee, that person is, except as stated in Subsection (3):
(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in view
of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in
obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance thereof is to make
a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor
to some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from
the promisee to the beneficiary;
The wisdom of utilizing the word "donee" has been questioned, since it does
not convey the true meaning of the third party's enforceable right against the
promisor.
4
The third party beneficiary doctrine has had an interesting history in New
York. There, as early as 1806, in a case in which a party promised to deliver
a cherry desk to the purchaser's wife, it was decided that the wife could recover.5
In the middle of the nineteenth century a New York court declared, in a situation
where a third party was allowed to enforce a promise made by the defendants
1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 782 (1951).
2 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 356 (third ed. 1959).
3 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 133 (1932).
4 By calling him a donee the Restatement does not imply that the intention
of the promisee was to make a gift to him, but in effect attaches that
label to him for the lack of any other. In these miscellaneous cases, which
are neither cases of paying debts or making gifts, the right of the beneficiary
depends upon there being 'an object to confer on him a right against the
promisor.' FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 551 (1947).
5 Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns. R. 139 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
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with another to try to collect a bill of exdhange and.apply it to a check owed.to
the third party, that as a general rule a third party, from whom no consideration
has passed, could sue and recover on a promise exacted on his behalf.6
However, in order to allow a third party to benefit from a contract entered
into by two others for his behalf, another theory was soon introduced in New York.
The court in Trotter v. Hughes7 reasoned that in a situation where a grantee of
the mortgagor bought subject to the mortgage, the mortgagee could recover by
subrogation against the grantee debtor.
The case of Lawrence v. Fox8 actually did not create any new rule of law.
It merely reaffirmed the right, lost for a while due to the influence of such cases
as Trotter v. Hughes, of a third party to enforce a promise made by two others
for his benefit. There, a person, Holley, loaned $300 to the defendant in con-
sideration for the latter's promise to pay $300 the next day to the plaintiff, to
whom Holley was indebted. The court, after stating that "such enforcement does
not depend on any relationship between the parties,"' concluded that the defendant
was liable to the third party beneficiary. The principle embodied in the subrogation
theory was weakened further in Thorp v. The Keokuk Coal Co.' 0 There, the de-
fendant agreed with mortgagor to pay the mortgagee's mortgage note and the
court reasoned that such a promise was enforceable by the mortgagee, stating:
But since it has become settled that the promise of the grantee brings
him into direct privity with the mortgagee, so that the latter can, at law,
sue upon his promise, I can perceive no reason for invoking the doctrine
of equitable subrogation as the sole ground for his liability in equity."
However, New York reverted to the subrogation method in Vrooman v.
Turner,2 where a grantee took subject to a mortgage and the court held that
a mere stranger, the mortgagee, could not claim the benefit of a contract made
by two others. In discussing the need for privity the court said:
A legal obligation or duty of the promise to him, will so connect him
with the transaction as ,to be a substitute for any privity with the promisor,
or the consideration of the promise, the obligation of the promisee furnish-
ing as evidence of the intent of the latter to benefit him, and creating a
privity by substitution with the promisor.' 3
This view persisted for several years with case after case denying recovery
to a third party due to the absence of a legal or equitable obligation owed by the
promisee to the third party.' 4 It has been suggested that this requirement explains
many of the inconsistencies in the New York cases as regards the right of a donee
beneficiary.'5
The New York courts gradually relaxed this rule by enlarging upon a doctrine
6 Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Westchester Co. Bank, 4 Denio 97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
7 12 N.Y. 74 (1854).
8 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
9 Id. at 271.
10 48 N.Y. 253 (1872).
11 Id. at 258.
12 69 N.Y. 280 (1877).
13 Id. at 284.
14 Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N.Y. 219, 222, 32 N.E. 49, 50 (1892): "[A"ccording to our
decisions no legal or equitable obligation, of which the law can take cognizance, was created
in favor of the wife against the husband oi~ his property by these circums tances." Wife was
not allowed to recover dower rights on a deed executed by her husband with the grantee
whereby the latter agreed to pay all incumbrances on the premises by mortgage or otherwise.
Townsend v. Rackham, 143 N.Y. 516, 522, 38 N.E. 731, 733 (1894): "["]he action (cannot)
be sustained by the third person in the absence of any liability in his favor due to grow from
the one to whom the promise was made." Third person cannot take advantage of a promise
by a mortgagor to pay a specified part of the money to him after the satisfaction of the
mortgage by the mortgagee when the latter owed him nothing.
15 4 CoRaiN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 827:
"In practically all the cases the plaintiff actually got judgment if he was in fact intended
by the promisee as a beneficiary, but the attempts made to reconcile the decisions with the
reasoning in Vrooman v. Turner are inconsistent and unsuccessful."
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previously announced in Todd v. Webber.16 There, the New York Court of Ap-
peals was confronted, not with a creditor-debtor or mortgagor-mortgagee situation,
but with an inter-family relationship. It held that an illegitimate child should be
allowed to enforce a promise, made by her putative father to her mother and
grandmother, whereby in return for services rendered to the child he would pro-
vide for her in his will. The idea was soon developed that a third party could
recover, if related to the promisee by blood or marriage.1 7
The view has been expressed that Seaver v. Ransom's operated as the "open-
ing wedge for the recognition of the donee beneficiary in New York."' 9 There,
a husband promised his wife, who was about to die and who desired to leave her
house and lot to her niece, that if she would forego this wish and sign the will
which he had prepared, he would make a sufficient provision for the niece in his
own will to make up the difference. He failed to do so and the niece instituted a
suit on the promise. The Court of Appeals decided that she should recover and
that the degree of relation should not be the sole basis for denying relief to the
third party. This court recognized the tendency of New York courts to permit
donee beneficiaries to collect and declared that "the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox
is progressive, not retrograde."20
The doctrine expressed in Seaver v. Ransom was a major step forward in the
recognition of practically all contract beneficiaries and it would seem safe to say
that a donee beneficiary will be protected in New York today. The general attitude
was noted in Merchants Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States F & Guar. Co 21 where
a surety company was found liable to a third party for insurance premiums on
its bond given to the city of Buffalo wherein it promised to pay all lawful claims
to third persons arising out of the contract. This court reviewed the leading cases
in this field, namely Lawrence v. Fox and Seaver v. Ransom, and concluded that
a clearly designated beneficiary was seldom left without a remedy.
Yet, problems still arise in this area of the law due to the importance which
some courts in New York place upon the necessity of a close family relationship
between the parties involved. For instance, in the case of In re Deyo's Estate,22
the court sustained the right of a surviving beneficiary to take a United States
bond in opposition to the deceased's estate and stated that "contracts made for
the benefit of third parties are recognized and will be enforced at the instance of
the donee beneficiary. . . .This is especially true where the beneficiary is a close
relative." Also, in In re Pincus' Estate,23 the court, faced with a situation where
the promisee and the third party claimant were brothers-in-law, stressed the need
for some degree of privity in the form of a moral or legal obligation before con-
cluding that the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox was progressive and that the promisee
by "coupling his obligation to his wife with the benefit to her brother, created
16 95 N.Y. 181 (1884).
17 Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N.Y. 109, 52 N.E. 724 (1899). A wife was allowed to sue
on a contract made by her husband with a third person to pay her certain moneys in the
event of success in contesting a will. Borland v. Welch, 162 N.Y. 104, 110, 56 N.E. 556,
557, 558 (1900):
Courts of equity, generally speaking, will not enforce a specific performance
of agreements, at the instance of volunteers. They make an exception, how-
ever, to this rule, in favor of a wife and children; and the reason for this
exception is, that for them the settlor is under a natural and moral obliga-
tion to provide.
The Court refused to permit collateral relatives to recover on a mar-
riage settlement, but recognized the rights of a wife and a child, who
were third parties, to enforce such a contract.
18 224 N.Y. 233, 110 N.E. 639 (1918).
19 2 WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 357.
20 Lawrence v. Fox, supra note 18 at 240.
21 253 App. Div. 151, 2 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
22 180 Misc. 32, 40, 42 N.Y.C.2d 379, 387 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
23 202 Misc. 482, 489, 107 N.Y.S.2d 736, 743 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
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joint rights which are enforceable against the estate in favor of each of the bene-
ficiaries."
Professor Corbin has criticized the idea that an obligation must be owed
to a third party by the promisee and has declared that it is "the expression of
donative intent" that is the important factor. He states:
It is the expression of donative intent by the promisee and the fact that
the promisor has contracted to perform to the benefit of the third party that
create a right in him. Close relationship may indeed be evidence of donative
intent, showing the reason or motive that induced the promisee to buy the
promise. But such intent can be shown by other kinds of evidence, and proof
of relationship can be and often has been dispensed with.24
Likewise, the objection that there is often no intention on the part of the promisor
to benefit the third party is not valid, since the motive or intent of the promisor
is immaterial due to the fact that his primary purpose is in receiving the con-
sideration given by the promisee, not in aiding the third party.2 5
Another relaxation of the Vrooman v. Turner doctrine occurred in the situa-
tions wherein the promisee was- a municipality and the third party, one of its
inhabitants, was allowed to recover on a contract entered into by the city with
another, usually a general contractor, for damages incurred in the performance
or non-performance of the contract26 A case often thought as being in contra-
diction to this group is H.R. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co.,27 wherein a city in-
habitant, who was unable to extinguish a fire in his building due to an inade-
quate supply of water and pressure from the citj hydrants, sued the water company
on its contract with the city. Relief was denied by the court, since there was an
essential element missing in this contract. Writing for the court, Judge Cardozo
stated:
The cases that have applied the rule of Lawrence v. Fox to contracts
made by a city for the benefit of the public are not at war with this con-
clusion. Through them all there runs a unifying principle: the presence
of an intention to compensate the individual members of the public in
the event of a default.28
Laborers have also followed the avenue established by Seaver v. Ransom in
order to assert their rights as donee beneficiaries on contracts executed by their
employers with other parties. For instance, in Fata v. Healy Co.,2 1 where a con-
tractor entered into a construction contract with the city, a laborer was allowed
to enforce the statutory provision that an employer must pay the prevailing wage
rate.
The New York Court of Appeals, in McClare v. Mass. & Ins. Co.,30 where
the State Athletic Commission compelled a surety company to execute a bond
promising to pay an obligation of an Athletic Club arising out of a boxing exhibi-
24 4 CoRam, op. cit. supra note 1, § 785.
25 4 CoRnq, op. cit. supra note 1, § 776; Cf. Ronzo v. Vernon Industries, 195 Misc. 873,
874, 91 N.Y.S. 2d 52, 54 (Sup. Ct. 1949): "To permit a third party donee beneficiary to
enforce a contract against the promisor, it appears only necessary that the intention of the
contracting parties was clearly to benefit the third party." Plaintiff's promise of forebearance
to sue on a note against a corporation, which promise was made to the mortgagee of the
corporation's assets, was properly interposed as a defense by the corporation as donee bene-
ficiary of the promise.
26 Rigney v. N.Y.C.H.R.R.R. Co., 271 NY.. 37, 111 N.E. 226 (1916). Resident re-
covered on a contract executed by the contractor with the city for injuries sustained by a
change of grade. Farnsworth v. Boro Oil & Gas Co., 216 N.Y. 40, 109 N. E. 860 (1915).
A city inhabitant was permitted to enjoin a gas company from raising rates above the price
provided for in contract with the city. Smyth v. City of New York, 203 N.Y. 106, 96 N.E.
409 (1911). Landowners were allowed to enforce a contract whereby the contractor promised
city to pay damages incurred by the landowners. Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 183 N.Y.
330, 76 N.E. 211 (1906). City inhabitant was allowed to enjoin water company from raising
rates above the amount specified in a contract with the municipality.
27 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
28 Id. at 166.
29 289 N.Y. 401, 46 N.E. 2d 339 (1943).
30 266 N.Y. 371, 195 N.E. 15 (1935).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
tion and a printer recovered his bill against the surety company, examined the
cases in this area and concluded that the rights of a third party beneficiary were
no longer dependent on a requirement of some obligation or duty running from the
promisee to the third party beneficiary. Yet, many discrepancies exist and will
continue to arise in New York due to the fact that:
Some of the older decisions, that the Court of Appeals now generally
passes by in silence, still cause confusion in decisions of various Appellate
Divisions and numerous lower courts. Not every hopeful plaintiff who asserts
that he has rights under a contract made by other parties should be
sustained; but his claim should in no case be denied on the bare ground
that he is a mere donee to whom the promisee owed nothing.31
In the instant case the lower court held that the promisor, the Physicians
News Service, Inc., assumed no duty to the petitioner. The Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Term, utilized a different test to determine whether the third party should
be permitted to recover. It followed the reasoning announced in Johnson v. Holmes
Tuttle Lincoln-Mercury,32 wherein an injured party was compensated as a third
party beneficiary for the failure of an automobile salesman to fulfill his promise
to obtain liability insurance for a purchaser, who was involved in the accident.
There, it was decided that if an intent to benefit the third party is evident from
the contract, the third party should recover.
It is submitted that, in line with case and secondary authority, the reclassi-
fication of the petitioner as a donee beneficiary was correct. Indeed, it is only
reasonable to conclude that her husband, by exacting this promise, meant to con-
fer a right upon her against the promisor, the defendant. Paul K. Rooney
INCOME TAx - ALIMONY - SPECIFIC DESIGNATION OF PORTION OF PAYMENT
AS CHILD SUPPORT REQUIRED IN ORDER TO MAKE PORTION TAXABLE TO HUSBAND.
- Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 215, permits a husband to deduct from his gross
income payments includible under section 71 in the gross income of his wife. Sec-
tion 71 (a) makes includible in the gross income of the wife payments imposed on
the husband by a decree of divorce or legal separation by a written agreement
incident to such divorce or separation; or by a written agreement, not incident to
a decree of divorce or legal separation, executed after the effective date of the
1954 Code. The written decree or written agreement must impose the obligation
because of the marital or family relationship. The payments must be periodic
within the meaning of section 71.1 Additionally, section 71 (a) makes includible
in a wife's income those payments the husband is ordered to make for her support
and maintenance by a decree entered after March 1, 1954.
Section 71 (b) prevents the husband from deducting "that part of any pay-
ment which the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement fix, in terms of an
amount of money or a part of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the
support of the minor children of the husband. The key word is "fix." Its interpre-
tation has given rise to variant views in numerous cases since inclusion of substan-
tially the same provisions in the Revenue Act of 1942.2 The Supreme Court of the
United States recently passed on its meaning for the first time. A divorced tax-
payer agreed to make periodic payments to his former wife. The agreement pro-
vided that the payments were to "be reduced in a sum equal to one-sixth of the
payments which would thereafter otherwise accrue," if any of the parties' three
children should marry, become emancipated, or die. The Commissioner contended
that this provision fixed one-half (one-sixth multiplied by three, the number of
31 4 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 827.
32 160 Cal. App. 2d 290, 325 P.2d 193 (1958).
1 INST. REv. Cooa Or 1954, § 71(c).
2 REv. ACT OF 1942, § 120.
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children) of the total payments as payable for the support of the children. The
Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's view, disallowing the deduction to the
husband;3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 4
On certiorari the Supreme Court held: affirmed. The agreement did not speci-
fically designate a portion of the payments as child support. Commissioner v. Lester,
366 U.S. 299 (1961).
The Revenue Act of 19425 added provisions to the Int. Rev. Code of 1939,6
designed to change the prevailing rule that prevented deduction of alimony pay-
ments,7 except where the divorce decree, the settlement, and state law operated as
a complete discharge of the liability for support.8 The Court placed heavy emphasis
on the legislative history of that act in an effort to determine precisely what Con-
gress meant by the word fix. The Senate passed a similar provision in 1941 that
contained the words specifically designate instead of fix." This bill was not enacted
into law. In the legislative history of the 1942 Act, however, Congress used the
word fix and the words specifically designate interchangeably.' 0 Despite this, it
would seem that one term is as difficult to apply to concrete facts as the other. An
agreement that could be said to fix a sum as allocable for child support could prob-
ably be said to specifically designate the sum, and vice versa. Also, the Court found
that congressional purpose was manifested in statements indicating a desire to
alleviate uncertainty as to tax consequences in payments to a divorced spouse."
These statements are primarily allusions to the uncertainty of the former require-
ment that a payment, in order to be deductible, had to operate under state law as
a complete discharge of liability for support. The overall purpose of the act that
they disclose does, however, suggest an interpretation of the word fix in a manner
permitting certainty as to who will pay the tax on payments to the wife.
In 1954, Congress changed some of the provisions relating to alimony pay-
meats. However, the provision relating to payments to the support of minor chil-
3 Jerry Lester, 32 T.C. 1156 (1959).
4 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
5 Rxv. ACT OF 1942, § 120.
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 22(k).
7 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
8 Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149 (1940).
9 H.R. 5417, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., § 117(a) (1941).
10 Much of the legislative history is general in language. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1942) states:
Moreover, the portion of such payments going to the support of minor
children of the husband does not constitute income to the wife nor a de-
duction to the husband. (emphasis added.)
However, the Report later indicates that the word "fix" and the words "specifically designate"
were considered synonymous:
Section 22(k) and section 171 do not apply to that part of any periodic
payment under section 22(k) . . . which, by terms of the decree or written
instrument . . . is specifically designated as a sum payable for the support
of minor children of the husband. If an amount or portion is so fixed...(emphasis added) Id. at 74.
11 S. REP. No. 673, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1942) states:
In addition, the amended sections will produce uniformity in treatment
of amounts paid in the nature or in lieu of alimony regardless of the
variances in the laws of different states concerning the existence and con-
tinuance of any obligation to pay alimony. In this respect the amendments
are designed to remove the uncertainty as to the tax consequences of
payments made to a divorced spouse....
The following appears at 103 CoNG. REc. 7267 (1941) (remarks of Senator George):
Mr. President, this is the alimony provision, which I explained some-
what in detail. It is inserted in the bill for the purpose of ironing out
the differences which have grown up by virtue of differing state laws and
also for the purpose of making certain when the payment of alimony or
separate maintenance is taxable to the husband rather than to the wife;
that is, to make it clear where it is taxable.
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dren 2 was taken verbatim from the 1939 Code.13 The interpretation that had
been given to the word fix by many courts between 1942 and 1954 was rejected in
Lester. The courts had been permitting allocation of a portion of the alimony
payments for support of minor children to be implied in circumstances similar to
those involved in Lester.
In Harold N. Fleming,4 the agreement provided that the wife was to be
paid $200 a month until a date approximately five years subsequent to the divorce.
If the child died before the expiration of five years, the payments were to be reduced
by $100 per month. After the five year period expired, the payments were to be
$100 per month until the child reached his majority. If the child died prior to
reaching his majority, but after expiration of the five year period, the payments
were to cease entirely. The court held that $100 a month was "fixed" as child
support within the meaning of the statute. In another case,' a husband agreed
to pay $1500 a month for the support of his wife and two children. A reduction
of $833.33 a month was permitted if the wife remarried. In the event of the death
of a child, a reduction of $416.66 a month for each child dying was permitted.
The Court held that there had been a "sufficient designation" of half of the monthly
payment for the support of the children.
Whether Congress was satisfied with this interpretation does not appear from
the congressional reports relevant to the enactment of the 1954 Code.'- This lack
of congressional discussion of prior interpretation of the word fix made it unneces-
sary for the Court to consider whether or not the prior interpretation had special
sanction because of the verbatim reenactment of the section.
Three decisions, all occurring subsequent to 1954, were discussed by the Court.
These cases represented two views. In Weil v. Comm'r. 7 the husband agreed to
pay his wife $800 a month. The agreement provided that as long as the wife
received the payments she would "live with and properly maintain, care for and
educate the children." If the wife remarried, the payments were to be reduced
to $400 a month, subject to further reduction of $200 a month upon the death,
marriage or establishment of independent residence by each of the couple's two
children. Except for the provisions in case remarriage occurred, the agreement
did not indicate what portion of the payment might have been attributable to the
children. In fact, the agreement went on to provide, "There shall be no revision
in the payments herein provided for to ,be made to the Wife by reason of the death
or majority of the children or either of them or by reason of the fact that they
then no longer reside with the Wife. . . ." The Court held:
We hold that sums are "payable for the support of minor children"
when they are to be used for that purpose only. Accordingly, if sums are
to be considered "payable for the support of minor children," their use
must be restricted to that purpose, and the wife must have no independent
beneficial interest therein.' s
The case was not as stringent in requiring specification as Lester, however,
because the Court went on to state:
It is quite true that the agreement must be read as a whole, Mandel v.
Commission, 7 Cir., 185 F.2d 50; Budd v. Commissioner, 6 Cir., 177 F.
2d 198, and that no particular formula, such as the phraseology we
have quoted from Section 22(k), is necessary. This particular instrument,
however, must be construed as expressing the husband's intention to make
payments to the wife and have her support the children . . . 19
Weil seemed to require language restricting the wife's use of a portion of the
12 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 71(b).
13 INT. RV. CODE OF 1939, § 22(k), added by § 117, Rev. Act of 1942.
14 14 T.C. 1308 (1950).
15 Mandel v. Comm'r., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 49105, aff'd., 185 F.2d 50 ( 7th Cir. 1950).
16 3 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws 4157, 4805 (1954).
17 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1951), reversing 22 T.C. 212 (1956).
18 Id. at 588.
19 Id. at 588.
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payments to the support of the children. But it gave approval to the practice of
interpreting the agreement as a whole in order to determine if the requisite desig-
nation was made.20
In Eisinger v. Comm'r.,21 the agreement provided for the husband to pay $125
a week to the wife. If the wife remarried, the payment was to be reduced to $62.50
($31.25 for each of the couple's two children). Reductions of $31.25 were per-
mitted for each child who died. In case the wife neglected to support the children,
the husband could support them. and deduct the costs from the payments he was
required to make to the wife. The agreement specifically stated that "it is the
intention of the parties that when 'both children shall have attained the age of 21,"
the husband shall pay alimony of $62.50 per week. The Court held that sufficient
designation of the money was made to preclude deduction by the husband. Weil
was distinguished, because Eisinger contained an additional number of provisions
indicating specific designation. It was pointed out that the agreement should be
read as a whole to determine whether or not a portion of the payments have been
fixed for child support. Language from Weil to this effect was quoted.
In Metcalf v. Comm'r.,2 2 the facts were stipulated. In July of 1950 the wife
filed for divorce. In September a decree pendente lite for custody of the five chil-
dren and support of $150 per week was awarded the wife. Three days prior to
the divorce, an agreement was entered into providing for division of the property,
for the wife's custody of the five children, and for a continuance of the obligation
of the husband to pay $150 a week to the wife for support of herself and the five
children. The agreement provided that as each child married, died, reached 21,
or became self-supporting, the payments were to be reduced by $25.00 a week. On
the remarriage of the wife, the payments were to be reduced by $25.00 per week.
In disallowing $125 of the husband's deduction, the Court said:
We believe the proper rule to be that it is sufficient if the parties, by
their agreement, have shown a clear intention to distinquish in the periodic
payments between what is paid to the wife because of her undertaking
to support the children, and what is for herself, independent of that
undertaking. In the case at bar . . .we find this readily apparent.
The Court mentioned that the whole agreement must be taken into considera-
tion. It felt that on this basis, the case was almost identical with Eisinger.
Metcalf v. Comm'r.23 and Eisinger v. Comm'r.2 4 reached results contrary to
Weil v. Comm'r.2-5 However, the different results were reached partially because
of different facts. There were certain elements the courts agreed on. The entire
agreement was to be examined to determine whether requisite specification existed.
In Well, the Court agreed with the Commissioner's statement that it is necessary
to find in the agreement "sufficient provisions showing an intention on the part of
Charles Weil to provide for his minor children specifically, as distinct from an
intention to provide for his former wife and have her in turn provide for the
20 A similar holding in Deitsch v. Comm'r. 249 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957), reversing
26 T.C. 751 (1956), was not cited by the Supreme Court. This case involved payments to
the wife of $250 a month until the oldest of two children reached 18. From that time until
the youngest child reached 18, the payments were to be $125.00 monthly. The payments
were to be reduced by one-half if one child died, and discontinued entirely if both children
died. The court held that the agreement did not sufficiently fix a portion of the payment
as child support, thus permitting the deduction to the husband. The court stated:
Only that part of such payment that the decree or instrument fixes as
payable for the support of the children is excepted under section 22(k).
The term "fix" is not ambiguous. It therefore must be construed in its
usual sense of to assign precisely. . . . Id. at 536.
Although this language is very strong, subsequent language approved the examining of
the entire agreement to determine if funds were "sufficiently earmarked" for child support.
21 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957), affirming P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 56048 (1956).
22 271 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1959), affirming 31 T.C. 596 (1959).
23 31 T.C. 596, aff'd., 271 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1959).
24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 56048 (1956), aff'd, 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957).
25 22 T.C. 212 (1956), rev'd., 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1957).
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children." 26 This does not seem much different from the statement in Metcalf
that there must be "shown a clear intention to distinguish in the periodic pay-
ments between what is paid to the wife because of her undertaking to support the
children, and what is for herself, independent of that undertaking. It must be
said, however, that, despite the similarity in some of -the general language, more
is involved in the divergent outcomes than a difference in facts. Any difference in
facts is a cumulative difference rather than one of character: there are sufficient
facts in all three cases to infer what the parties thought the cost of supporting the
children would be. The additional element involved is one of difference of opinion
in statutory interpretation. The Court in Eisinger made this statement:
The general rule which we here approve is that wher the settlement agree-
ment, read as a whole, discloses that the parties have earmarked or desig-
nated or apportioned or allocated the payments to be made, one part to
be payable for alimony, and another part to be payable for the support of
children, with sufficient certainty and specificity to readily determine
which is which .... (the statute is satisfied)27
Compare the above statement with the following from Weil:
We hold that sums are "payable for the support of minor children" when
they are to be used for that purpose only. Accordingly, if the sums are
to be considered "payable for the support of minor children," their
use must be restricted to that purpose, and the wife must have no beneficial
interest therein.28
The first statement requires words indicating the manner in which the pay-
ment is allocated; the second statement requires a fixing of the money as usable
only for child support. The Weil case was decided by the Second Circuit in 1957.
Lester came to the Second Circuit early in 1960.29 Judge Lumbard was the only
judge sitting in Lester who also heard the Weil case. The provision in question
afforded a basis for holding that the agreement disclosed which portion of the
payments had been allocated as child support, and which portion was considered
alimony; it did not provide a basis for holding that a portion of the payment was
restricted in use, and that the wife had no beneficial interest therein. It read:
In the event that any of the children of the parties hereto shall marry,
become emancipated, or die, then the payments herein specified shall on
the happening of each such event be reduced in a sum equal to one-
sixth of the payments which would thereafter otherwise accrue and be
payable in accordance with the terms and provisions hereof.
The Court, making many of the same observations that the Supreme Court
made, declared, in effect, that the agreement would have to restrict the use of a
portion of the money by the wife to child support. Building on the laguage of
Weil, above quoted, the Court stated:
Unless we have misapprehended its meaning, Congress intended to tax
the wife on all the payments unless the agreement itself declared in what
proportion she must allocate them to the children.30
Much of the Supreme Court .opinion is not particularly helpful in terms of
concrete definitions. It mentions several times that the portion must be "fixed"
or "specifically designated." The Court stated that "a sufficiently clear purpose is
not enough," but went on to declare that "that section requires that their action
be clear and specific." 31 Two statements made by the Court are more helpful.
The Court stated that "the allocation to child support made therein must be
'specifically designated' and not left to determination by inference or conjecture. ' '3 2
The opinion earlier states that "the agreement must expressly specify .... ,,ss
In view of these statements and the facts of the case itself, it would seem that all
26 240 F.2d 5843 588 (2d Cir. 1957).
27 250 F.2d 303, 308 (9th Cir. 1957).
28 240 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1957).
29 Commissioner v. Lester, 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
30 Id. at 357.
31 366 U.S. 299, 306 (1961).
32 Id. at 306. (emphasis added.)
33 Id. at 303 (emphasis added.)
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agreements, no matter how clearly they indicate that an amount is included because
it is a cost that will be incurred in caring for the children, will not contain the
requisite specific designation unless they also require the wife to actually spend
that amount on the children. Whether the wife can be ordered under local law to
spend the money in accordance with the agreement is irrelevant for tax purposes.34
The only requirement for tax purposes is that the agreement expressly state that a
portion is to be used for the support of the children, not leaving the entire payment
to "the unfettered command of the wife."3 5
The decision may accomplish two worthwhile objectives:
1. The express specification required to defeat the husband's deduction will
enable a husband to make more definite provision for his children without
running the risk of tax losses.36
2. Congressional intent may be implemented by the establishment of certainty
in the area of alimony payments. However, one could fairly entertain some
misgivings concerning the capacity of Lester to alleviate uncertainty in this
area. A statement in Weil indicates why:
The cases construing and applying the terms of the statute have been
numerous. In the bewildering maze of different types of separation agree-
ments, containing a great variety of clauses requiring payments to the wife
for her own maintenance and for the support of her minor children .... 37
A similar statement is found in Deitsch:
It would be futile to review the numerous Tax Court decisions relied upon
by counsel for both parties. They are in *general based upon settlement
contracts with provisions different in detail from those presented here.38
Thus the myriad factual patterns that could present themselves make it diffi-
cult to forsee the ultimate effect of the Supreme Court's decision. Requiring express
words cannot completely eliminate the necessity of determining the meaning of
the many ambiguous agreements that will continue to appear. However, it must
be admitted that the majority of cases that were formerly in doubt will now be
governed by the rule in Lester, without requiring resort to litigation.39
Richard C. Wilbur
PATENT LAW - PATENT MONOPOLY DOES NOT EXTEND TO REPLACEMENT OF
UNPATENTED ELEMENTS OF PATENTED COMBINATION - United States Letters
Patent 2,569,724 were issued to Harry A. Mackid and Stanley Duluk and assigned
to the General Motors Corporation. Convertible Top Replacement Company was
licensed under a territorial grant for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, re-
ceiving right, title and interest in the patent, including all rights of action for
34 Id. at 304.
35 Id. at 303.
36 In Eisinger v. Comm'r., 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957) the court stated at 307:
The husband saw to it that if the wife failed to use her support money
for the support of the children, the husband could pay to the children
or for them and deduct such amounts from the wife's "alimony pay-
ments." This was a laudable agreement on the part of both for the benefit
of their children. It establishes in our minds how the parties regarded
the payments.
For behaving so "laudably," the husband lost his deduction. Lester should permit this
kind of an agreement to exist without precluding full deduction by the husband.
37 249 F.2d 534, 536 (2d Cir. 1957).
38 Deitsch v. Comm'r., supra note 20 at 536 (6th Cir. 1957).
39 See Comm'r. v. Gertrude Haber, 8 A.F.T.R. 5060 (2d Cir. 1961), reversing, by
stipulation on the authority of Lester, Haber, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 60084 (1960). The Tax
Court had permitted inference of allocation of part of the payment for child support from
an agreement clearly indicating what part of the payment was being made because of the
children.
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infringement. The Mackie-Duluk patent is for a combination of elements' - for
a "Convertible Folding Top with Automatic Seal at Rear Quarter." The normal
life of the fabric portion of the top is two or three years; the frame is designed
to last for the entire life of the car. The Aro Manufacturing Company manu-
factures and sells, for replacement purposes, the fabric portions of convertible
tops, including replacement tops for convertible automobiles equipped with Mackie-
Duluk tops. Convertible Top brought suit against Aro for direct and contributory
infringement of the Mackie-Duluk patent. The District Court' found that the
patent was valid' and infringed. Aro was enjoined from further infringement,
and the question of damages for past infringement was referred to a master. The
Court of Appeals affirmed,4 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.' Held:
Reversed. Maintaining the "use of the whole" of the patented combination, through
replacement of spent, unpatented parts, one at a time, either of the same element
repeatedly or different elements successively, does not constitute reconstruction. It
is no more than the lawful right of the owner to repair his property. Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
The basis for the patent system is found in the Constitutional provision:
"The Congress shall have power ...To promote the progress of science and use-
ful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries." 6 From this it can be concluded that
"The primary purpose of the patent system is not the reward of the individual
but the advancement of the arts and sciences. Its inducement is directed to dis-
closure of advances in knowledge which will be beneficial to society; it is not a
certificate of merit, but an incentive to disclosure."7 The patentee is granted "nothing
more than a means of preventing others, except under license from the patentee,
from appropriating his invention" for a period of seventeen years, in return for
disclosing his invention to the public. At the end of this statutory seventeen-year
monopoly, the rights covered by the patent become public property, the patentee
losing all monopolistic control over them.
A patent may be granted for "A new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,"'9
unless the subject matter sought to be patented differs so little from the prior art
"that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the in-
vention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
1 The patent contains ten claims. Claims 1-9 all begin: "In a convertible automoble
body, the combination. . . . " (Emphasis added.) Claim 10 does not specifically claim a
"combination" but lists five separate elements, clearly in combination. The first claim reads:
1. In a convertible automobile body, the combination of a lower metal
body structure or tonneau having a body panel, a folding bow structure
supported by the tonneau and having flexible top material supported by the
bows and having the top material at the rear quarter extending down and
supported by said panel on the inside and considerably below the top of
the metal body or tonneau, a sealing strip of rubber with a leaning in
rubber fin secured to the top of the side of the tonneau at the belt line
and arranged to engage the outside of the folding top material when the
top is raised, and a wiping arm secured to a bow and operating so that
the wiping arm is caused to wipe the inside lower portion of the top material
in raising the top and press the top material against the inside of the
sealing strip when the top is raised.
2 Convertible Top Replacement Co. v. Aro Mfg. Co., 119 U.S.P.Q. 122 (D. Mass. 1958).
3 Id. at 123: "Mackie-Duluk was a substantial and enlightened step, filling a long-felt
want, in a field in which defendants have produced, with one exception, only paper patents,
the most emphasized being foreign, which did not even purport to what Mackie-Duluk ac-
complished."
4 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 270 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1959).
5 362 U.S. 902 (1960).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
7 Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945).
8 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945).
9 66 Stat. 797, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
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matter pertains."'10 A combination consisting of known elements, of themselves
unpatentable, can be patented if as a combination they produce new and useful
results. Together they must be more than a mere aggregation of elements perform-
ing no new or different function - the concert of the elements must in some way
exceed the sum of its parts."'
Since every element in the combination is considered essential to the com-
bination, a person cannot directly infringe a combination patent unless he makes
the whole combination.' 2 The patentee's monopoly over a combination patent
would be restricted severely if a supplier was allowed to furnish articles especially
for use in the patented combination, supplying the very essence of what was
patented, to a large market. The number of immediate or direct infringers, the
ultimate consumers, might be large, but if they had each committed an incon-
sequential infringement, suit against each would be impractical. This has been
recognized by the courts, and, through "an expression of both law and morals,""
the doctrine of contributory infringement has arisen.' 4 The 1952 Patent Act,' 5
statutorily defining "infringement" for the first time,'6 grants recovery against those
guilty of contributory infringementY.7 It must be noted that unless there is a direct
infringement of the patent, there can be no contributory infringement.'8
Once the article covered by the patent has been sold to another, the purchaser
obtains a right to use and sell the patented article.' 9 If an unpatented element in
the combination wears out before the combination as a whole is destroyed, a problem
arises as to when the replacement of this element constitutes permissable "repair"
by the purchaser and when it constitutes "reconstruction" of the patent.
In Wilson v. Simpson,20 "doubtless the leading case .. . that deals with the
distinction"' 2' between repair and reconstruction, the purchaser of a patented planing
machine replaced detachable blades which were unpatented elements of the patented
10 Id. at § 103.
11 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147(1950). While this Court has sustained combination patents, it never has ven-
tured to give a precise and comprehensive definition of the test to be
applied in such cases .... It is agreed that the key to patentability of a
mechanical device that brings old factors into cooperation is presence or
lack of invention. In course of time the profession came to employ the
term "combination" to imply its presence and the term "aggregation"
to signify its absence.... The more aggregation of a number of old parts
or elements which, in the aggregation, perform or produce no new or
different function or operation than theretofore performed or produced
by them is not patentable invention. . . . The conjunction or concert of
known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some
way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices
patentable. Id. at 150-52.
12 See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Anderson-Prichard Refining Corp., 122 F.2d 829 (10th Cir.
1941).
13 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 677 (1944) (dis-
senting opinion): "[T]he doctrine of contributory infringement is an expression of both
law and morals. It is but one more phase of a more comprehending doctrine of legal lia-
bility enforced by this Court."
14 See, Roberts, Contributory Infringement of Patent Rights, 12 HARv. L. REv. 35
(1898).
15 66 Stat. 792 (1952), 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293.
16 See Frederico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. (1952).
17 66 Stat. 811 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
18 "But the mere manufacture of a separate element of a patented combination, unless
such manufacture be proved to have been conducted for the purpose, and with the intent,
of aiding infringement, is not, in itself, infringement." Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent In-
vestment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 677 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Bloomer v. Mc-
Quewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852).
20 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850).
21 365 U.S. 336, 342.
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combination. The knives had a life of 60-90 days in contrast to the life of several
years for the machine as a whole. The Court held that there was no infringement,
because the replacement of even an essential element of the combination is only
repairing the machine for use. The Court, however, limited permissible repairs to
the replacement of those elements which were contemplated by the inventor to be
replaced during the life of the machine as a whole.
The right . . .to replace the cutter-knives is not because they were of
perishable materials, but because the inventor of the machine has so ar-
ranged them . . .that the machine could not be continued in use without
a succession of knives at short intervals. Unless they were replaced, the
invention would have been but of little use to the inventor or to others.
The other constituent parts of this invention, though liable to be worn out,
are not made with reference to any use of them which will require them
to be replaced. These, without having a definite duration, are con-
templated by the inventor to last so long as the materials of which they are
formed can hold together in use in such a combination. No replacement
of them at intermediate intervals is meant or is necessary. They may be
repaired as the use may require. With such intentions, they are put into
the structure. . . . [B]eyond the duration of them a purchaser . . . has
not a longer use. But if another constituent part is meant to be only tem-
porary in the use of the whole, and to be frequently replaced, because
it will not last as long as the other parts of the combination, its inventor
cannot complain . . . that the purchaser uses it in the way the inventor
meant it to be used, and in the only way in which the machine can be
used. 22
Following Wilson, the courts formulated a number of tests to determine whether
the replacement of an unpatented element of a patented combination amounted to
repair or reconstruction. Among the factors considered were: the importance of the
replaced element in relation to the inventive concept;23 the relative cost of the
unpatented component with respect to the cost of the combination ;24 the relative
life of the replaced component to the useful life of the combination ;25 and the
structural domination of the parts replaced with respect to the combination as a
whole.
26
In Aro, the entire Court2" agreed with the premise that Aro would be guilty
of contributory infringement of the Mackie-Duluk patent "if, but only if, such a
replacement by the purchaser himself would constitute direct infringement. ' 2 Or,
the issue was, "more specifically, whether such replacement by the car owner is
infringing reconstruction or permissible repair." 29
Justice Whittaker, writing for the majority, said that without a specific claim
of the fabric or its shape in the patent, the fabric could be treated as no more
than an unpatented component of a patented combination. He refused to "ascribe
to one element of the patented combination the status of the patented invention
itself,"30 and would not hold that, because the fabric was essential to the combination,
to replace it would amount to infringement.
Justice Whittaker considered the patented combination, as a whole, validly
in the hands of the convertible automobile owner, with the determinative question
22 Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 125-26 (1850).
23 See, e.g., Davis Electrical Works v. Edison Electric Light Co., 60 F. 276 (1st Cir.
1894).
24 See, e.g., El Dorado Foundry, Machine & Supply Co. v. Fluid Packed Pump Co.,
81 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1936).
25 See, e.g., Micromatic Hone Corp. v. Mid-West Abrasive Co., 177 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.
1949).
26 See, e.g., Automotive Parts Co. v. Wisconsin Axle Co., 81 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1935).
27 There were four opinions: the majority opinion written by Justice Whittaker; a con-
curring opinion by Justice Black; an opinion by Justice Brennan in which he concurred in
the result; and the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan. Justices Frankfurter and Stewart
joined in the dissent.
28 365 U.S. 336, 341.
29 Id. at 342.
30 Id. at 344-45.
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being: "[Wjhether the owner of a combination patent, comprised entirely of un-
patented elements has a patent monopoly on the manufacture, sale, or use of the
several unpatented components of the patented combination. ' 'al
The majority in Aro followed the policy of the two Mercoid decisions: 32 the
patentee should not be allowed to monopolize the sale of unpatented components
of a patented combination. In those cases the patent was for a combination furnace
stoker system. The right to make the combination, the entirety of which was made
by neither the patentee nor his licensee, was conditioned on the purchaser's buying
his stoker switch from the licensee. The Mercoid Corporation made stoker switches
whose sole purpose was for use in the patented combination. The Supreme Court
recognized that the Mercoid Corporation was guilty of contributory infringement
of the patent but refused to grant recovery because the patentee was misusing his
patent by extending his monopoly to the unpatented elements - a reward the Court
felt was not a valid extension of the patent monopoly. Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, said: "The patent is for the combination only. Since none of the
separate elements of the combination is claimed as the invention, .none of them
when dealt with separately is protected by the patent monopoly."33
Adhering to the policy of the two Mercoid decisions, Justice Whittaker reasoned
that "no element, not of itself separately patented, that constitutes one of the
elements in a combination patent is entitled to patent monopoly."3 4 The question
remained, whether the replacement of the convertible top fabric amounted to
permissible "repair" or infringing "reconstruction." Following the reasoning of
Wilson v. Simpson,3 5 as interpreted by Judge Learned Hand - "The [patent]
monopolist cannot prevent those to whom he sells from . . .reconditioning articles
worn by use unless they in fact make a new article"3 6 - the majority concluded that
"mere replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of the
same part repeatedly or different parts successively, is no more than the lawful right
of the owner to repair his property."3 7 This, according to the majority, is a "plain
* and practical test."381
Justice Brennan, concurring in the result, disagreed with the test applied by
the majority and said that "there are circumstances in which the replacement of
a single unpatented component of a patented combination short of a second creation
of the patented entity may constitute a reconstruction. :. . There is no single test
to which all must yield; rather the determination is to be based upon ... a number
of factors."39 Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, also disagreed with the test
applied by the Court: "[T]here is no single yardstick for determining whether
particular substitutions of new for original unpatented parts of a patented com-
31 Id. at 342.
32 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp.
v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
33 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944).
34 365 U.S. 336, 345.
35 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850).
36 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945)
(dictum). (Emphasis added.)
37 365 U.S. 336, 346.
38 Id. at 343.
39- Id. at 362-63 (concurring opinion). (Emphasis added.) The factors to be weighed,
according to Justice Brennan, are the ones that have been applied by the courts in previous
"repair-reconstruction" cases. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
The District Court in Aro did not set down a specific test: "Whether the test be that
of substantial reconstruction or domination of the part replaced, or frequency of replace-
ment, . . . replacing the fabric is not permissive repair." 119 U.S.P.Q. at 124-25.
The Court of Appeals applied the same test as Justices Harlan and Brennan: "When
replacement -of a patented component of a patented combination constitutes a legitimate
repair and when it constitutes a forbidden reconstruction . . . is difficult to determine
and cannot be determined by the application of any verbal formula. Each case must be
decided on its own facts, pretty much as an individual instance." 270 F.2d at 205.
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bination amount to permissible repair or forbidden reconstruction."
40
Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, criticized the opinions of Justices Harlan
and Brennan, because they introduced "wholly unnecessary and undesirable con-
fusions, intricacies and complexities" 41 into the question of determining "repair" or
"reconstruction."
The opinions of Justices Harlan and Brennan differ from one another with
respect to the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a)42 in determining
"repair" or "reconstruction." Justice Brennan said that the question is "so far a
question of law as to relieve appellate review from the restraints"43 of this rule,
while the dissent refused to make an independent judgment, concluding that the
lower courts applied the appropriate standards. According to the dissent, the Court
was "compelled by the dictates of good sense or by Rule 52(a)"4 4 to give deference
to the "judgments fairly and reasonably reached in two lower courts. ' 45
The patentee can attempt to monopolize the sale of unpatented components
of his patented combination in two ways: (1) by attempting to monopolize the sale
of components as a condition for the initial construction of the combination, as in
Mercoid; or (2) by attempting to monopolize the sale of parts to replace worn-out
elements, as in Arc. Section 271 of the 1952 Patent Act, defining infringement, was
included to eliminate the effects of Mercoid,46 so that thereafter the patentee could
dominate the sale of unpatented component parts and not "be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right"47 - as long as the
component part is not a staple article of commerce.
That no blanket monopoly was intended to be given by the 1952 Patent Act
for the sale of replacement parts can be seen from the testimony of the chief drafts-
man of section 271, Mr. Giles Rich, when he was questioned as to whether the manu-
facturer of unpatented replacement parts would be guilty of contributory infringe-
ment of patents on the original article. There would be liability for infringement,
said Mr. Rich, "depending on the kind of part"48 supplied, or if the replacement
part "is in substance the very thing which was invented." 49 This answer reflects no
more than the permissible "repair" versus infringing "reconstruction" test that
theretofore had been applied. In other words, the Act was intended to eliminate
the effects of Mercoid, but it did not meet the question as to whether the re-
placement of unpatented elements would amount to contributory infringement.
40 365 U.S. 336, 372 (dissenting opinion).
41 Id. at 346 (concurring opinion).
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a): "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the
court shall . . . set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute
the grounds of its action. . . . Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses." (Emphasis added.)
43 365 U.S. 336, 367 (concurring opinion).
44 Id. at 380 (dissenting opinion).
45 Ibid.
46 Mr. Giles Rich, the chief draftsman of section 231 of H.R. 3760, which eventually
became section 271 of the 1952 Patent Act, testified concerning the effects of this section:
"[I]t would alleviate the confusion that has arisen as a result of 'the Mercoid case." Hear-
ings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcommittee 3 of the House Committee on the judiciary, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1951).
47 66 Stat. 811, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d):
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or con-
tributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty
of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having
done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement.
48 Hearings on H.R. 3760, supra note 46 at 153.
49 Ibid.
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The Justice Department filed a brief amicus curiae in Aro. It conceded that
the questions to be answered were primarily ones of substantive patent law, but
said that the issues "must be resolved in relation to the provisions and policy of
the antitrust laws."50 The Justice Department took the approach that "the patentee
would be given . . . [a] partial monopoly over the unpatented materials [which
has been] held not to be within the legitimate scope of the patent monopoly,"51
and therefore urged reversal.
Since the monopoly granted by the patent laws is not in keeping with the
general policy of the United States against monopolies, they have been construed
narrowly by the courts.2 The patent owner should be protected "in the enjoyment
of just what he has. been granted,"-" but there is "no constitutional or statutory
authority for giving it [the patent] additional value by bringing into its monopoly
all or any of its unpatented parts."54
The Court in the instant case said that the owner of the automobile does
not make the combination top until the patented "entity, viewed as a whole, has
become spent."'5 5 The dissenting opinion and the opinion of Justice Brennan called
for a series of tests to see if the part could be renewed. The basis for their con-
clusions was that in some combinations there is a part so important, or so essen-
tial to the very combination, that this part should be given patent protection.
In other words, they would recognize that under some conditions the patent should
be recognized as protecting the very part itself, and not merely the combination
as a whole. Mercoid did not allow this, and although the effects of Mercoid with
respect to the monopolization of component parts as a requisite to the making of
a new combination, have evidently been eliminated, the reasoning behind the
two Mercoid decisions is quite useful in determining whether the monopoly should
extend to replacement parts, a situation not explicitly covered in the statutory
definition of infringement.
The fact that an unpatented part of a combination patent may dis-
tinguish the invention does not draw to it the privileges of a patent. That
may be done only in the manner provided by law. However worthy it may
be, however essential to the patent, an unpatented part of a combination
patent is no more entitled to monopolistic protection than any other un-
patented device.58
Applying this reasoning of Mercoid to a situation involving replacement parts,
it can be argued that patent protection should not be given to an element of the
patented combination unless that element is in itself patented. "One royalty to
one patentee for one sale is enough under our patent law as written.15 7
For the majority in Aro, the problem to be solved was whether the patentee
could prevent the owner of a patented combination from maintaining that com-
bination, as long as he in fact did not make a new article. Or could the patentee
ascribe to an essential, but unpatented, "element of the patented combination the
status of the patented invention in itself?"58 On the other hand, the opinions of
Justices Brennan and Harlan focused on the part replaced in relation to the com-
bination as a whole to determine "repair" or "reconstruction."
The patentee in the Aro situation is not prevented from selling the un-
patented replacement part on the open market, but he cannot compel the con-
vertible owner to buy from him, nor will public policy allow him a monopoly
50 Brief for the Justice Department as Amicus Curiae, p. 9.
51 Id. at 11.
52 See, e.g., Precision Instrument Co. v. Automotive Maintainance Machinery Co., 324
U.S. 806 (1945).
53 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 680 (1944) (dissenting
opinion).
54 Ibid.
55 365 U.S. 336, 346.
56 Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944).
57 365 U.S. 336, 360 (concurring opinion).
58 Id. at 344-45.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
"to derive his profits, not from the invention on which the law gives a monopoly,
but from the unpatented supplies"5 9 necessary for the purchaser to maintain his
property.
Since the invalidity of a patent is a defense in an infringement suit,60 the
courts often do not reach the question whether there has been infringement, but
instead strike down the patent on grounds of invalidity. In spite of the statutory
command that "A patent shall be presumed valid,""1 in recent years, courts have
held patents invalid in a majority of cases decided. 62 This situation has caused
Justice Jackson to comment: "[T]he only valid patent is one that this Court
has not been able to get its hands on." 63
The validity of the Mackie-Duluk patent was not challenged in the Supreme
Court, but there are indications, especially in the opinion of Justice Black,64 that
this patent may well have been held invalid, had that question been at issue.
The question of the validity of the patent should have no bearing on the test
applied to determine whether infringement has occurred in these "repair-reconstruc-
tion" cases. If the part supplied is indeed new and useful, amounting to an in-
vention or discovery, the patentee could have afforded himself the protection of
the patent laws. Since "form may be . . . subject for a patent,' 6' had the patentees
wished to monopolize the sale of the replacement fabric in Aro, they could have
done so in the same manner as they used to obtain the monopoly on the com-
bination as a whole - by availing themselves of the patent laws and obtaining
a patent on their invention. Not having obtained a patent on the fabric, they
could not assert a monopoly on its sale. "The patent monopoly is not enlarged
by reason of the fact that it would be more convenient to the patentee to have
it so, or because he cannot avail himself of its benefits within the limits of the
grant. 66
The Aro Court re-examined the limits of the patent monopoly in an effort
to determine how far the patentee will be allowed to go in monopolizing his in-
vention. The test applied by the Court to this situation involving replacement
parts - whether the combination was made anew - is in keeping with the general
attitude against the extension of monopolies, but whether this test will preclude
"undesirable confusions, intricacies or complexities' 67 from its application is ques-
tionable. This decision should not be construed as an attack by the Court on the
patent system, but rather as a recognition of patent rights when validly asserted,
and an attack on the attempt to monopolize unpatented articles under the guise
of patent protection. This decision, by giving direction in a confusing area of law,
should be considered as an effort to uphold the integrity of the patent system.
Harold E. McKee
59 Brief for the Justice Department as Amicus Curiae, p. 12.
60 66 Stat. 812(1952), 35 U.S.C. § 282.
61 Ibid.
62 A study prepared for the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copy-
rights shows that in the period 1949-58 there were a total of 1014 findings on the validity
of patents in the district courts. In 525 of these cases, more than one-half of the total, the
patent was found invalid. STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMxM. ON PATENTS, TRADEmtARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS, SEN. COMBI. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESs., AN ANALYSIS OF
PATENT LITIGATION STATISTICS (Comm. Print 1961).
63 Jungerson v. Otsby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
64 "The District Court held that this aggregation of nonpatentable parts
was patentable as having achieved a new result. . . . I shall act on that
assumption although I am not sure in just what respect the aggregation
of the common components could possibly have served a new purpose or
have been the result of anything more than the simplest childlike mechanical
skill." Aro. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 365
U.S. 336, 351 (1961) (concurring opinion of Justice Black).
65 Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 124 (1850).
66 B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942).
67 365 U.S. 336, 346 (concurring opinion).
RECENT DECISIONS
REAL PROPERTY - TITLE TO LAND - PURCHASER'S SUBVENDEE HELD BARRED
By LACHES FROM ASSERTING CLAIM AGAINST VENDOR'S ASSIGNEE DESPITE PAY-
MENT OF MINERAL TAXEs FOR TWENTY-SEVEN YEARS AFTER RECONVEYANCE. -
In 1916 one Spann took a conveyance of 103.7 acres of land with vendor's lien
retained to insure the payment of purchase money notes, and three years later Spann
conveyed to Whiteside, a party to this action, an undivided one-half interest in any
minerals in or on the land. This conveyance to Whiteside was by quitclaim deed,
and was duly recorded by him. The purchase money notes were extended from
time to time by Webster, a successor in title to Spann's grantor. In 1932, approxi-
mately 10 years after the last note had originally been due, Spann reconveyed the
property to Webster in consideration for the cancellation of the purchase money
notes. This conveyance was duly recorded, but Whiteside, the sub-vendee, received
no notice of the reconveyance at that time. In fact, he did not become aware of it
until immediately before he filed an answer in this suit, some twenty-seven years
after the conveyance. In an action to try title to the land, both sides moved for a
summary judgment. The motion of the plaintiff Bell (a successor in title to the
vendor, Webster) was granted. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed. Held: The
sub-vendee, Whiteside, had an equitable right to protect his interest in the property
by tendering payment of the purchase money notes within a reasonable time after
the recission of the vendor; but since the vendor had been under no duty to give
notice of his rescission to the sub-vendee, the sub-vendee had failed to act within a
reasonable time and was now barred by the doctrine of laches from asserting his
right to the mineral interest. Whiteside v. Bell, 347 S.W. 2d 568 (Tex. 1961).
The usual rule with respect to a purchase money lien is that one who takes
such a lien has only an equitable right which can be destroyed by a subsequent
sale to a bona fide purchaser for value.' The lien can come into existence in any
one of three ways: it can be implied in equity, provided for by statute, or con-
tained on the face of the deed or notes.2 Some states, Texas included, regard the
lien as "title reserved," i.e., the vendor retains a tide superior to that of the vendee
and has a right to rescind upon default by the purchaser in his payments on the
purchase money notes.3 The question, then, was not whether the vendor had the
right to accept a reconveyance from the purchaser after the latter's default, since
this is a well-settled rule of law in Texas,4 but rather, whether the redemptive rights
of the sub-vendee can be cut off by laches without giving him notice of the recon-
veyance. There is no doubt that if the sub-vendee tenders payment of the notes
within a reasonable time after the vendor has rescinded or has announced his inten-
tion to do so, the sub-vendee may thereby protect his interest in the land. This
was conceded by the court in the majority opinion..
Whiteside, the sub-vendee, conceded that he was aware of the outstanding
lien .at the time 'he took the quitclaim deed from Spann. Under the somewhat
peculiar rule of the Texas courts, one who takes by a quitclaim deed is not con-
sidered a bona fide purchaser for value." This means that Whiteside's purchase
did not destroy -the lien with respect to his mineral interest, or, to analogize to
mortgage procedure, Whiteside took the mineral interest "subject to" the lien.7
It is important to note, however, that the quitclaim deed executed by Spann to
1 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 14, at 66 (1943).
2 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 69.
3 Bound v. Dillard, 140 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
4 Lanier v. Faust, 81 Tex. 186, 16 S.W. 994 (1891); Hamblen v. Folks & Walsh,
70 Tex. 137, 7 S.W. 834 (1888); Burgess v. Millican, 50 Tex. 397 (1880).
5 347 S.W.2d 568, 570, citing R. B. Spencer & Co. v. May, 78 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App.
1935). See also, State v. Forest Lawn Lot Owners Assoc., 152 Tex. 41, 254 S.W.2d 87
(1953); Howell v. Townsend, 217 S.W. 975 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
6 Rule v. Richards, 149 S.W. 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Clark v. Altizer, 145 S.W.
1041 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Smith v. Cook, 142 S.W. 26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
7 Brooks v. Erbar, 186 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Homeland Realty Co. v.
Wheelock, 119 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Whiteside was recorded shortly after the conveyance. This is important, because
if the original vendor had searched the record before taking the reconveyance
from Spann, as he was bound to do at his peril," he would immediately have become
aware of the sub-vendees interest in the land. The sub-vendee, on the other hand,
would not learn of the reconveyance through his title search, because the reconveyance
would not have been recorded until after he had received his interest, and it would
seem to be unreasonable -to require the sub-vendee to have notice of a subsequent
transfer of the same property by his predecessor in title? To do so would mean that
the sub-vendee would have to make periodic checks of his grantor's chain of title,
and this would indeed be a burdensome task.
Another rule of law which had a direct bearing upon the outcome of the case
was the doctrine of laches. "Laches is principally an inequity of permitting a claim
to be enforced."' 1  Knowledge, unreasonable delay, and change of position are
essential elements.1' The mere passage of time is insufficient to justify the appli-
cation of laches, 1" and the doctrine will not be applied to one who has been justi-
fiably ignorant of the facts creating his right or cause of action."
The first question to be answered in the determination of this case was whether
the vendor was bound to give notice to the sub-vendee of his rescission. The lower
court held that, as a matter of law, the reconveyance to the vendor constituted
a rescission. That the vendor had the right to rescind is not questioned; the ques-
tion is whether this rescission cuts off the rights of an interested party having no
notice of it. Since the sub-vendee acquired whatever rights he might have from the
vendee, it is often said that the sub-vendee who takes with notice of the original
lien, "stands in the shoes of the vendee."'1 From this point of view, it is clear that
the only remedy open to the sub-vendee is to tender the unpaid purchase price to
the vendor." But how can the sub-vendee be expected to step forward and pro-
tect his rights when he has no reason to suspect that they are in jeopardy? True
enough, the sub-vendee had knowledge of the outstanding notes of the vendee,
but did he not have the right to assume that they were not in default until he
received information to the contrary? It is well settled that if the vendor had
brought a suit for the rescission, rather than rescission by a private agreement as
in this case, the sub-vendee would not have been bound by the decision in the
action unless he had been named as a party in the suit.'6 In his treatise on mort-
gages, Glenn states that "there is no reason in principle, why the vendor should
not be treated as a mortgagee in every sense of the word."' 7 The majority seems
8 Buckalow v. Butcher-Arthur, Inc., 214 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). This
case held that the consequence of the purchaser's failure to investigate title to land is that
he is charged with the knowledge he would have acquired had he made the search.
9 White v. McGregor, 92 Tex. 556, 50 S.W. 564 (1889); Wirt's Heirs v. Vick, 203
S.W. 63 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
10 BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY 1016 (4th ed. 1951). See also, Brady v. Garrett, 66 S.W.2d
502 (Teax. Civ. App. 1933).
11 Pearson v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 321 S.W.2d 620 (Teax. Civ. App. 1959).
12 Byrnes v. Standard, 6 Ill.App.2d 441, 128 N.E.2d 658 (1955); Hodge v. Kennady,
198 Va. 416, 94 S.E.2d 274 (1956).
13 Alexander v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 130 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1942).
14 10 TEXAS L. Rlv. 244 (1931). This article contains an interesting analysis
of the case of Yett v. Houston Farms Development Co., 41 S.W.2d 305, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931). In that case M conveyed to T, with vendor's lien retained, and T later con-
veyed a seven-eighths mineral interest to D. T. being in default, he reconveyed to M in
consideration of the cancellation of the lien. In an action to try title, the court held that
the rescission was binding upon the sub-vendee. It appears in the facts of the case, how-
ever, that at the time of the rescission the sub-vendee was insolvent and would have been
unable to tender payment of the lien. It is intersting to note that this case was not cited
in the instant case.
15 Foster v. Powers, 64 Tex. 247 (1885).
16 Pierce v. Moremen, 84 Tex. 596, 20 S.W. 821 (1892); Stephens v. Mot, 82 Tex.
81, 18 S.W. 99 (1881).
17 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 14.1 at 71.
RECENT DECISIONS
to have felt that a foreclosure suit is not analogous to a "private" rescission, and
that the latter is absolute at the moment the vendor decides to rescind.
Great weight was given by the court to three cases concerning the notice
question. In the first case, that of Revard v. Wood,1 8 the court stated that the
vendor, "was not required to make sub-vendees a party to this suit."'19 Nowhere
in that opinion, however, is any mention made of whether notice to the sub-vendee
was required; in fact, though it is not included in the statement of facts, one may
infer from the language of the court that the sub-vendee had notice but had failed
to do anything about it.
In Williams v. Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co.,20 the court held that the sub-
vendee was not a necessary party to the foreclosure, and since the sub-vendee had
not acted for a period of 18 years, he was now barred by laches. But a very impor-
tant distinction can be made between that case and the one now under discussion.
In the Williams case the sub-vendee had not acted for 18 years, but it is con-
ceded in the opinion that he had knowledge, or notice, of the foreclosure at the
time that it took place. The court stated:
The record shows conclusively that the appellant, Williams, obtained knowl-
edge of the Coleman-Fulton foreclosure in cause No. 2694 shortly after
its rendition, yet took no action in regard thereto until the filing of the
present suit.21
The case of Howell v. Townsend22 also held that a sub-vendee was not a
necessary party to a lien foreclosure action, but in that case the contention of the
sub-vendee was that the foreclosure was barred by a four year statute of limitations
because he had not been a party to the extension of the purchase notes. No ques-
tion of notice of either the extension or of the foreclosure was involved in the case.
In Whiteside, the court also cited several cases23 in which it was said that a
vendor may not rescind the sale without giving notice of his intention to his pur-
chaser. But the court went on to distinguish these cases on the ground that they
did not involve the rights of the sub-vendee to notice. As has been previously
mentioned, however, it is well settled that a sub-vendee "steps into the shoes" of
the vendee when dealing with the vendor. Under this rule, if the vendee were
entitled to notice, the sub-vendee would also be entitled to notice.
There is another point which serves to justify Whiteside's lack of knowledge
concerning the reconveyance. His interest went only to the mineral deposits in
the land. The ownership of the surface was inconsequential to him. He would
have no reason, therefore, to have any interest in the transfer of the surface rights
to the acreage. Also, because of the several extensions granted by the vendor,
Whiteside would have been quite reasonable to assume that the lien had been paid
at least ten years prior to the reconveyance, and that he therefore had no reason
to tender the unpaid amount to the vendor. It cannot be claimed that Whiteside
had neglected his interest during the twenty-seven year period, as the court seems
to imply, because during that time he paid the taxes on the property, both state
and county, and his name was listed on the records of the tax commissioner.
Concerning the question of notice, the court in Huffman v. Mulkey24 said:
18 156 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
19 Id. at 562.
20 157 S.W.2d 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
21 Id. at 997.
22 217 S.W. 975 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). But see, Noble v. Kahn, 206 Old. 13, 240
P.2d 757 (1952). In this case, where the owner of an undivided one-half interest in land
was made a party to the foreclosure of a subsequent mortgage and suffered judgment by
default, it was held that the owner of such mineral interest was entitled to attack the fore-
closure in an action to quiet title brought by the grantees of the foreclosure sale purchaser,
and that possession of the surface was not a bar to the mineral owner's claim.
23 Phillips v. Heraden, 78 Tex. 378, 14 S.W. 857 (1890); Heirs of Redden v. Smith,
65 Tex. 26 (1885).
24 78 Tex. 556, 14 S.W. 1029 (1890). See also, Skelly Oil Co. v. Johnson, 209 Ark.
1107, 194 S.W.2d 425 (1946), where M conveyed land to D by warranty deed reserving
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The right of a vendor, who has conveyed land through a deed on its face
reserving a lien for purchase money, to rescind, is not an absolute right, even
in cases in which the purchase money has become due and remained un-
paid, as may be seen by an examination of the many cases decided by
this court. The right of the vendor to rescind, in such cases, does not
exist at all until the vendee has failed to pay the purchase price in ac-
cordance with the contract, and one to whom a vendee has conveyed is
entitled to all the rights of his vendor, which cannot be affected by any
transaction between the original vendor and his vendee after the latter
has parted with his interest in the land.25
If the vendor was in fact not obliged to give notice of his intention to rescind,
then the sub-vendee would be barred by laches from asserting his claim 27
years after the reconveyance. The logical effect of the rule in this case, that
notice is not required to be given to the sub-vendee, is that land titles, where cer-
tainty of ownership is a prime policy consideration, may be determined by the
application of the indefinite rules of laches. The court in this case held that 27
years was too long a period of inactivity on the part of the sub-vendee. But
would a 20 year period have been too long? Or a 15 year period? If a sub-
vendee of today were to desire to know how long he could refrain from tender-
ing payment to the vendor, what would be the answer? This case stands for the
anomalous proposition that a person, in this case the sub-vendee, who has a. definite
right, the right to tender payment, may discover that his right has been constantly
decreasing over a period of 27 years, and that, at the end of this period it is
finally eliminated once and for all, through the application of an "equitable"
doctrine. At the same time, the interest of the vendor in the land is constantly
gathering strength, until at the end of the same period his interest in the land is
said to cancel out all other interests. The application of laches to a situation such
as the one presented by this case frustrates the very purpose of title recordation.
The minority opinion, (this was a 4-3 decision), stated that:
Lands, and particularly mineral estates therein, are often held for long
periods of time for investment and speculative purposes and I would be
most hesitant to rely on the uncertain and often complicated doctrine
of laches to effect the evaporation of a land title or interest in land which
had vested in accordance with a duly recorded written interest.26
In any case involving a "private" rescission, the better rule would be to refuse
to recognize the unilateral rescission by the vendor, or even a bilateral rescission
by agreement between the vendor and vendee, unless notice was first given to
any sub-vendee claiming an interest. This is not an unreasonable burden, because
the vendor has only to take notice of any subsequent conveyances in the title record
of his vendee, and then make a reasonable effort to contact these parties. This
giving of notice would supply a definite time at which the sub-vendee must act
or have his interest cut off by rescission. In addition, the question as to ownership
of the various interests in the land would be settled at a much earlier date, and
would not be uncertain for such a long period of time. Also, the doctrine of
laches would not have to be relied upon to determine the proper ownership. It
is submitted that the proper determination of this case would have been a finding
for the petitioner, Whiteside.
Theodore A. Fitzgerald.
vendor's lien to secure the payment of the unpaid purchase money, and D conveyed mineral
interests to third persons by recorded deeds. It was held by the court that a foreclosure by
M of the vendor's lien without making the mineral grantees parties did not foreclose the
equities of redemption of such mineral grantees. In Deruy v. Noah, 199 Okl. 230, 185 P.2d
189 (1947), Noah acquired a separate estate in the minerals on or under a tract of land
subject to a pre-existing mortgage, and in a subsequent foreclosure proceeding Noah was
not made a party. It was held that the interest of Noah was not foreclosed and that Deruy
claiming the entire title to the land as purchaser at the foreclosure sale, could not acquire
title to the mineral interest merely by possession of the surface.
25 Id. at 1030. fEmphasis supplied]
26 347 S.W.2d 568, 574.
